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ARTICLES
THE MECHANISMS OF DERIVATIVES
MARKET EFFICIENCY
DAN AWREY*
These are not your parents' financial markets. A generation ago, the image of Wall
Street was one of floor traders and stockbrokers, of opening bells and ticker sym-
bols, of titans of industry and barbarians at the gate. These images reflected the
prevailing view in which stock markets stood at the center of the financial universe.
The high point of this equity-centric view coincided with the development of a sig-
nificant body of empirical literature examining the efficient market hypothesis
(EMH): the prediction that prices within an efficient stock market will fully incor-
porate all available information. Over time, this equity-centric view became con-
flated with these empirical findings, transforming the EMH in the eyes of many
observers from a testable prediction about how rapidly new information is incorpo-
rated into stock prices into a more general-and generally unexamined-statement
about the efficiency of financial markets.
In their seminal 1984 article The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, Ron Gilson
and Reinier Kraakman advanced a causal framework for understanding how new
information becomes incorporated into stock prices. Gilson and Kraakman's
framework provided an institutional explanation for the empirical findings sup-
porting the EMH. It has also played an influential role in public policy debates
surrounding securities fraud litigation, mandatory disclosure requirements, and
insider trading restrictions. Yet despite its enduring influence, there have been few
serious attempts to extend Gilson and Kraakman's framework beyond the relatively
narrow confines in which it was originally developed: the highly regulated, order-
driven, and extremely liquid markets for publicly traded stocks.
This Article examines the mechanisms of derivatives market efficiency. These
mechanisms respond to information and other problems not generally encountered
within conventional stock markets. These problems reflect important differences in
the nature of derivatives contracts, the structure of the markets in which they trade,
and the sources of market liquidity. Predictably, these problems have led to the
emergence of very different mechanisms of market efficiency. This Article describes
these problems and evaluates the likely effectiveness of the mechanisms of deriva-
tives market efficiency. It then explores the implications of this evaluation in terms
of the current policy debates around derivatives trade reporting and disclosure, the
macroprudential surveillance of derivatives markets, the push toward mandatory
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central clearing of derivatives, the prudential regulation of derivatives dealers, and
the optimal balance between public and private ordering.
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INTRODUCTION
These are not your parents' financial markets. A generation ago,
the image of Wall Street was one of floor traders and stockbrokers, of
opening bells and ticker symbols, of titans of industry and barbarians
at the gate.' These images reflected the prevailing view in which
public equity markets-conventional stock markets-stood at the
center of the financial universe. The high point of this equity-centric
view coincided with the development of a significant body of
empirical literature examining the efficient market hypothesis
I These images were reinforced within popular culture by movies such as Oliver
Stone's WALL STREET and books such as Bryan Burrough and John Helyar's BARBARIANS
AT THE GATE: THE FALL oF RJR NABisco (1990).
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(EMH): the prediction that prices within an efficient stock market will
fully incorporate all available information.2 Over time, this equity-
centric view became conflated with these empirical findings, trans-
forming the EMH in the eyes of many observers from a testable pre-
diction about how rapidly new information is incorporated into stock
prices into a more general-and generally unexamined-statement
about the efficiency of financial markets.3
In their influential 1984 article The Mechanisms of Market
Efficiency,4 Ron Gilson and Reinier Kraakman advanced a causal
framework for understanding how new information becomes incorpo-
rated into stock prices. Gilson and Kraakman's framework was
grounded in the observation that the efficiency of financial markets is
a function of the market for information: how costly it is to acquire,
process, and verify and, accordingly, its distribution within the mar-
ketplace.5 For any initial distribution of information, Gilson and
Kraakman then offered an account of how the trading activities of one
or more types of traders served to ensure that this information ulti-
mately found its way into prices.6 Amongst its many contributions,
this framework provided a detailed institutional explanation for the
empirical findings underpinning the EMH.
2 See infra Part I for a more detailed discussion of the EMH.
3 In the process, the benchmark of "efficiency" itself became prone to
misunderstanding and abuse. Arguably nowhere was this more evident than in the context
of the 1990s policy debates surrounding derivatives regulation and, specifically, the
statements of former Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan. See, e.g., Alan
Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., Remarks at the Financial Markets Conference of
the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta (Feb. 21, 1997), https://www.federalreserve.gov/
boarddocs/speeches/1997/19970221.htm ("[T]he need for U.S. government regulation of
derivatives instruments and markets should be carefully re-examined . . . private market
regulation appears to be achieving public policy objectives quite effectively and efficiently."
(emphasis added)); Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., Remarks at the
Conference on Bank Structure and Competition of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
(May 1, 1997), https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/1997/19970501.htm
("The unbundling of financial products is now extensive throughout our financial system.
Perhaps the most obvious example is the ever-expanding array of financial derivatives ....
These and other developments facilitating the unbundling of financial products have surely
improved the efficiency of our financial markets." (emphasis added)); see also The
Regulation of OTC Derivatives: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Banking and Fin. Servs.,
105th Cong. (1998) (testimony of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Federal Reserve Board),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/testimony/1998/19980724.htm ("Inappropriate
regulation distorts the efficiency of our market system and as a consequence impedes
growth and improvement in standards of living.").
4 Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70
VA. L. REv. 549 (1984).
5 Id. at 594-95 (describing taxonomy of information costs),
6 See infra Part I for a more detailed description of Gilson and Kraakman's
framework.
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Gilson and Kraakman's framework has gone on to play an influ-
ential role in public policy debates surrounding securities fraud litiga-
tion, mandatory disclosure requirements, and insider trading
restrictions.7 It has also been used as a conceptual basis for under-
standing the economic role of securities underwriters, venture capital
firms, auditors, credit rating agencies, and other "reputational
intermediaries." Yet despite its enduring influence, relatively few
scholars have attempted to extend this framework beyond the narrow
confines in which it was originally developed: the highly regulated,
order-driven, and extremely liquid markets for publicly traded stocks.8
This dearth of scholarship is especially puzzling given the Cambrian
explosion of new financial markets, institutions, and instruments that
has taken place since Gilson and Kraakman published their seminal
article. Moreover, many of these new markets, institutions, and instru-
ments bear little resemblance to the conventional stock markets at the
heart of Gilson and Kraakman's original framework.
This paper examines the mechanisms of derivatives market effi-
ciency. More specifically, it examines the mechanisms of market effi-
ciency within bilateral or "over-the-counter" (OTC) derivatives
markets.9 These markets include the $493 trillion global markets for
equity, credit, foreign exchange, interest rate, and other swaps.' 0 They
also include the myriad of smaller and more exotic markets for swaps,
options, and structured products based on physical commodities,
7 See infra Part I for a more detailed survey of this role.
8 See infra Part IV for a survey of some of the literature examining the EMH in the
context of fixed income and derivatives markets. Notably, Gilson and Kraakman have
themselves extended their framework to fixed income markets. See Ronald J. Gilson &
Reinier Kraakman, Market Efficiency After the Financial Crisis: It's Still a Matter of
Information Costs, 100 VA. L. REv. 313 (2014).
9 Accordingly, this Article does not directly examine the mechanisms of market
efficiency within exchange-traded options or futures markets. However, as we shall see, a
number of the mechanisms of OTC derivatives market efficiency-specifically contractual
standardization, netting and collateral regimes, and clearinghouses-perform a
functionally equivalent role within exchange-traded derivatives markets.
10 See MONETARY & EcoN. DEP'T, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, STATISTICAL
RELEASE: OTC DERIVATIVES STATISTICS AT END-DECEMBER 2015, AT 2 (2016), http://
www.bis.org/publ/ote hyl605.pdf. In its simplest form, a swap is a series of mutual forward
obligations whereby two counterparties agree to periodically exchange cash flows over a
specified period of time. Perhaps the most straightforward example is an interest rate swap
pursuant to which one counterparty agrees to make payments at a fixed interest rate to
another counterparty who in turn agrees to pay the borrower a variable (or "floating")
rate. The fixed rate borrower receiving the floating rate thus stands to benefit from any
subsequent increase in interest rates, whereas its counterparty receiving the fixed rate will
benefit from any decline. The periodic payments due under a swap are calculated with
reference to what is known as the "notional amount." The resulting obligations are then
netted out against one another so that only one counterparty is required to make a
payment in any given period.
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emissions rights, bandwidth, macroeconomic variables, the volatility
of financial instruments or indices, and even Acts of God. These
derivatives share three core features." First, unlike equity securities,
derivatives are executory contracts that contemplate the performance
of obligations by one or both traders over a potentially significant
period of time. The introduction of time brings with it the prospect of
counterparty default, making the identity of each trader highly rele-
vant from a contracting perspective. This idiosyncratic counterparty
credit risk also contributes to the economic and legal heterogeneity of
many derivatives contracts. Second, derivatives markets have not his-
torically benefited from institutional arrangements equivalent to con-
ventional stock exchanges that serve to bring together prospective
buyers and sellers, regulate the trading environment, or ensure the
widespread dissemination of price, volume, and other trading infor-
mation. Third, trading within derivatives markets instead revolves
around a relatively small network of large financial intermediaries
known as "dealers." These dealers quote prices to other traders on the
basis that they are willing to take either side of a trade. Dealers thus
represent the primary sources of liquidity within derivatives markets.
Together, these three core features of derivatives markets intro-
duce information and other problems not generally encountered
within conventional stock markets. These problems include the high
initial costs of identifying potential traders willing to take the opposite
side of a trade, along with the subsequent costs of engaging in both ex
ante screening and ex post monitoring of their creditworthiness. They
also include the costs of determining the prevailing market price in the
absence of institutional arrangements designed to aggregate and dis-
seminate prices and other trading information. Compounding matters,
even if traders are able to observe market prices, idiosyncratic credit
risk and the economic and legal heterogeneity of many derivatives
makes it difficult for them to disentangle the constituent elements of
price reflecting market, counterparty credit, and other risks. This het-
erogeneity introduces potentially significant price distortions, under-
mining the ability of traders to distill the informational signal
embedded within any price changes from the noise generated by idio-
syncratic counterparty credit risk and economic and legal heteroge-
neity. Finally, there are the information and agency problems
stemming from the dealer-intermediated structure of derivatives mar-
kets, and the fact that liquidity within these markets is ultimately a
11 See infra Part III for a more detailed discussion of these features and how they serve
to distinguish derivatives from public equity securities.
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function of the capacity and incentives of dealers to perform this
important market-making role.
Predictably, these problems have led to the emergence of very
different mechanisms of market efficiency than those identified by
Gilson and Kraakman. 12 The first mechanism consists of the small net-
work of dealers at the center of global derivatives markets. These
dealers use their client networks and relationships in order to identify
and match traders looking to take the opposite sides of a trade. They
also typically possess considerable expertise in screening and moni-
toring counterparty credit risk. Perhaps most importantly, however,
by contractually interposing themselves between traders, dealers act
as reputational intermediaries, using their status as repeat players to
enhance the credibility of the commitments underpinning derivatives
trades. This market-making role places dealers in an advantageous
position to aggregate market information and, insofar as it is in their
economic interest to do so, to share this information with other
traders.
Dealers are supported in their market-making role by a second
mechanism of market efficiency: interdealer brokers and electronic
communication networks (ECNs). Interdealer brokers are
intermediaries that act as conduits for the exchange of market infor-
mation between dealers looking to enter into specific derivative
trades, whether for the purposes of hedging existing exposures or
engaging in proprietary trading. ECNs, meanwhile, enable dealers to
communicate and trade directly with one another via dedicated web-
based trading portals. Interdealer brokers and ECNs thus perform a
role for dealers analogous to the one that dealers perform for their
clients: aggregating market information and matching dealers looking
to take the opposite sides of a trade. They can also act as informal
channels for the dissemination of private trading information. In the
process, interdealer brokers and ECNs can be viewed as lowering
search costs within derivatives markets.
While the first two mechanisms of derivatives market efficiency
can be viewed as extensions of Gilson and Kraakman's original frame-
work, the final two mechanisms take us in an altogether different
direction. The third mechanism consists of the highly specialized and
intertwined contractual and legislative regimes governing the enforce-
ability of closeout netting13 and the related treatment of financial col-
lateral in the event of a derivative counterparty's default or
12 See infra Part IV for a more detailed examination of these mechanisms.
13 As described in greater detail in Section IV.C, closeout netting involves the
termination, valuation, and netting out of contractual obligations in the event of
counterparty default or insolvency.
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insolvency. Under certain conditions, these regimes can combine to
render derivatives traders economically indifferent to the
creditworthiness of their counterparties, thereby reducing the costs of
counterparty screening and monitoring and eliminating idiosyncratic
counterparty credit risk as a source of potential price distortions. The
fourth mechanism, meanwhile, is embodied by the highly successful
efforts of organizations such as the International Swaps and Deriva-
tives Association (ISDA) in promoting greater contractual standardi-
zation within many derivatives markets. Like specialized netting and
collateral regimes, the legal homogeneity generated by this standardi-
zation can be viewed as helping to eliminate potential price
distortions.
Viewed together, these four mechanisms serve to highlight the
two sides of every derivatives contract. For the purposes of this
Article, the first-"bright"-side consists of an exposure to an under-
lying claim, whether it be an equity or debt security, loan, currency,
commodity, or other asset or payoff. In the vast majority of cases,
these claims will be sensitive to the revelation of new information,
thus giving Gilson and Kraakman's original framework-updated to
reflect a different institutional environment-analytical traction in
understanding how new information becomes incorporated into deriv-
atives prices. The second-"dark"-side consists of each trader's
exposure to the default of its counterparty. Importantly, and in direct
contrast with Gilson and Kraakman's mechanisms, the institutional
arrangements used by counterparties to manage these exposures are
designed to reduce the incentives of traders to acquire, process, and
verify new price relevant information.1 4 Indeed, at least in theory,
these arrangements act as substitutes for investments in new informa-
tion. Ultimately, it is the tension between the mechanisms operating
on bright and dark sides of derivatives markets that gives rise to many
of the important analytical and policy problems examined in this
Article.
As we shall see, each of the four mechanisms described in this
Article holds the potential to make a significant contribution towards
the efficiency of derivatives markets. By the same token, important
questions remain regarding the effectiveness of these mechanisms and
whether their prospective benefits outweigh the associated costs. The
dealer-intermediated structure of derivatives markets makes it diffi-
cult for traders to observe the trading behavior of other market par-
14 In this respect, the Article shares a number of analytical parallels with the recent
work of Kate Judge examining the importance of information, and "information gaps," in
equity and money markets. Kathryn Judge, Information Gaps and Shadow Banking, 103
VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017).
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ticipants, thereby undermining efficiency-enhancing trade and price
decoding.15 While we might expect dealers to share some of the
trading information they acquire by virtue of their privileged market
position, we would also expect them to fiercely protect the economic
value of this information-ultimately at the expense of market effi-
ciency. At the same time, specialized netting and collateral regimes
and contractual standardization will only serve to eliminate
counterparty credit risk and potential price distortions under a very
narrow-and, in many cases, unrealistic-range of circumstances. Far
from demonstrating their effectiveness, an examination of these
mechanisms thus reveals the unique obstacles to market efficiency
stemming from the nature of derivatives contracts and the structure of
the markets in which they trade.
This examination of the mechanisms of derivatives market effi-
ciency also raises a host of important and timely policy questions. The
most important of these questions revolve around the post-crisis regu-
latory reforms introducing new derivatives trade reporting and disclo-
sure requirements, enhancing macroprudential surveillance of
derivatives markets, imposing mandatory central clearing on many
standardized derivatives, and strengthening the prudential regulation
of derivatives dealers. 16 More broadly, this examination raises impor-
tant questions about the optimal balance between public regulation
and private ordering within derivatives markets.
This paper proceeds as follows. Part I begins with an overview of
Gilson and Kraakman's original framework and briefly describes its
influence, major criticisms, and enduring insights. Part II frames the
motivation for this Article: identifying the principal reasons why we
might care about derivatives market efficiency. Part III then describes
why Gilson and Kraakman's framework does not offer a compelling
account of the mechanisms of derivatives market efficiency, looking
specifically at the nature of derivatives contracts, the structure of the
markets in which they trade, and the sources of market liquidity. Part
IV identifies and examines four mechanisms of derivatives market
efficiency: dealers, interdealer brokers and ECNs, specialized netting
and collateral regimes, and the ongoing efforts of ISDA to promote
contractual standardization within derivatives markets. Part V then
explores some of the important policy implications that flow from this
examination, with particular focus on the potential impact of post-
15 See infra Part I for a more detailed description of the mechanics and efficiency
implications of trade and price decoding.
16 See infra Part V for a more detailed exploration of these policy questions.
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crisis regulatory reforms targeting derivatives markets and dealers on
market efficiency.
This Article provides a detailed description of the institutional
structure underpinning modern derivatives markets. It also yields a
number of important policy insights. First, recent regulatory reforms
designed to enhance the transparency of derivatives markets by intro-
ducing mandatory trade reporting and disclosure requirements may
not have the desired impact on market efficiency. Simultaneously,
however, the regulatory push toward mandatory central clearing of
many standardized derivatives may have a previously under-
appreciated and salubrious impact on market efficiency by reducing
idiosyncratic counterparty credit risk and economic and legal hetero-
geneity. Second, recent regulatory reforms designed to enhance the
macroprudential surveillance of derivatives markets may not compel
market participants to produce the type or granularity of information
needed to successfully identify potential threats to financial stability.
Third, new prudential requirements introduced in the wake of the
financial crisis may serve to undercut the incentives of dealers to per-
form their important market-making role, thereby reducing market
liquidity and, ultimately, efficiency. Given this prospect, it may be
worthwhile to rethink the optimal balance between public and private
ordering within derivatives markets with a view towards promoting
the development of alternative market structures. Finally, and more
broadly, this examination suggests that conventional wisdom about
what works in securities laws may at best offer an incomplete frame-
work for understanding the regulation of derivatives markets.
I
MECHANISMS OF MARKET EFFICIENCY: GILSON AND
KRAAKMAN'S FRAMEWORK AND ITS INFLUENCE
There are few concepts in financial economics that have attracted
more attention-or controversy-than "market efficiency."' 7 The
concept of market efficiency is grounded in the Efficient Market
Hypothesis or EMH. First articulated by Eugene Fama, the basic pre-
diction at the heart of the EMH is that trading strategies based on
available information will not yield risk-free profits within an efficient
17 For a synthesis of this controversy, as well as a useful survey of the empirical
research testing the EMH, see Burton G. Malkiel, The Efficient Market Hypothesis and Its
Critics, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 59 (2003). For a post-crisis update, see Burton G. Malkiel, The
Efficient-Market Hypothesis and the Financial Crisis, in RETHINKING THE FINANCIAL
CRISIs 75 (Alan S. Blinder et al. eds., 2012). As Malkiel suggests, much of the controversy
surrounding the EMH stems from a misunderstanding of its core predictions. Id. (arguing
that "critics of EMH are using a far too restrictive interpretation of what EMH means").
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market.18 Put simply, traders should not be able to beat the market by
trading on information that is already available within the market-
place. This "no arbitrage" hypothesis is often reformulated into the
statement that security prices in an efficient market will fully reflect
all available information.19 An "efficient" market can thus be under-
stood as one in which new information is rapidly incorporated into
security prices.
Fama broke the EMH down into three sub-hypotheses. The
"weak" form hypothesis predicts that all historical information will be
incorporated into prices.20 The "semi-strong" form hypothesis, in con-
trast, predicts that all new and publicly available information will be
incorporated into prices.21 Thus, for example, by the time a trader
reads in The New York Times or Wired that Apple Inc. has
announced the launch of its new Apple Watch, the semi-strong form
hypothesis would predict that this information will already be
reflected in the price of Apple's shares-thereby depriving the trader
of any profitable trading opportunities. The "strong" form hypothesis
then extends this prediction to all private information.22 It would thus
predict that the expected impact of the Apple Watch on Apple's
future cash flows will be reflected in its share price before the launch
announcement, when only a small group of insiders are aware of its
existence, product features, and other relevant information. As this
example illustrates, these sub-hypotheses are ordered on the basis of
the relative strength of their predictions: While the inability of a
trader to extract profitable trading opportunities from historical infor-
mation would seem unremarkable to all but the most devout technical
analysts, the inability of a trader with material private information to
profit from this advantage would seem very remarkable indeed.23 The
EMH thus views a market in which private information fails to gen-
erate profitable trading opportunities as demonstrably more efficient
than a market in which such opportunities continue to exist.
In 1978, economist Michael Jensen boldly stated that "there is no
other proposition in economics which has more solid empirical evi-
18 Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work,
25 J. FIN. 383, 384-85 (1970).
19 Indeed, this is how Fama himself framed the EMH in the introduction to his seminal
article. Id. at 383 (describing the ideal market as one in which "security prices at any time
'fully reflect' all available information").
20 Id. at 388.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 4, at 558 (discussing the differences between the
different forms of the Efficient Market Hypothesis).
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dence supporting it than the Efficient Market Hypothesis." 2 4 Subse-
quent theoretical and empirical scholarship has put a significant dent
in this claim. 25 For the present purposes, however, the more important
point is that, despite the general consensus amongst financial econo-
mists at the time, neither Fama nor any of his contemporaries put for-
ward a compelling causal explanation for the observation that new
information was rapidly incorporated into security prices.2 6 Indeed, it
would fall to two legal scholars, Ron Gilson and Reinier Kraakman, to
articulate a theoretical framework for understanding how information
found its way into prices. This framework centered around what
Gilson and Kraakman characterized as the "mechanisms of market
efficiency." 27
Gilson and Kraakman's framework rests on three fundamental
building blocks. 28 First, the availability of information for the pur-
poses of the EMH is a function of the costs incurred by traders in
order to acquire, process, and verify it.29 The higher these costs, the
narrower the initial distribution of this information is likely to be
within the marketplace, and the longer and potentially more circui-
tous the route this information must take before it becomes reflected
in security prices.30 Hence, the efficiency of the market for informa-
24 Michael C. Jensen, Some Anomalous Evidence Regarding Market Efficiency, 6 J. FIN.
ECON. 95, 95 (1978).
25 Indeed, there is now an enormous body of scholarship in the fields of economics,
psychology, law, and other fields dedicated to the study of these and other anomalies. See,
e.g., ROMAN FRYDMAN & MICHAEL D. GOLDBERG, BEYOND MECHANICAL MARKETS
(2011) (describing "Imperfect Knowledge Economics" and how individuals'
misinterpretations of the significance of economic fundamentals can impact the price of
financial assets); DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011) (examining
various cognitive biases in human decision making); ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL
EXUBERANCE (3d ed. 2015) (examining the structural, psychological, and cultural factors
that can cause prices to diverge from economic fundamentals); ANDREI SHLEIFER,
INEFFICIENT MARKETS: AN INTRODUCTION To BEHAVIORAL FINANCE (2000) (arguing that
the assumptions of investor rationality and frictionless arbitrage underpinning the EMH
are contradicted by institutional and psychological evidence).
26 See William H. Beaver, Market Efficiency, 56 Accr. REv. 23, 23 (1981) ("The
problem is not simply that concepts are difficult to test empirically, a pervasive
phenomenon not unique to the efficient market literature, rather, the problem is that, at a
conceptual level, prior to empirical testing, it is unclear what is meant by the term market
efficiency.").
27 Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 4, at 549.
28 As Gilson and Kraakman observe, these building blocks are in many respects
clarifications or refinements of Fama's original framework. Id. at 558-59 (discussing
Fama's tripartite classification of efficiency tests and finding that different information sets
implicate their own processes of price formation and efficiency dynamics).
29 See id at 594 (discussing types of information costs).
30 See id. at 558, 567, 593 (describing the interplay between the distribution of
information and price). For a case study demonstrating how long and circuitous this route
can be, see Robert P. Bartlett III, Inefficiencies in the Information Thicket: A Case Study of
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tion will have a direct impact on the efficiency of the market for cap-
ital.31 Second, and as a consequence, a market that efficiently
incorporates one piece of information into prices may not do so with
respect to other pieces of information. 32 How efficiently a market
incorporates a new piece of information will instead be determined by
the costs of acquiring, processing, and verifying that specific piece of
information. Finally, the concept of market efficiency as envisioned by
the EMH is based on an inherently relative benchmark: the speed
with which new information is reflected in security prices.33 Accord-
ingly, we must be careful to distinguish between the "informational"
efficiency of a market as measured by the EMH and the "accuracy" of
the prices observed within that market.34
Gilson and Kraakman use these building blocks to construct a
causal framework for understanding an important puzzle at the core
of the EMH: How do we square the empirical observations of Fama
and others that public equity markets rapidly incorporate new infor-
mation into prices with the fact that most information is not costlessly
and instantaneously available within the marketplace? Put differently:
How does information that may initially be available to only a very
small number of traders become reflected in prices? Gilson and
Kraakman's answer to this question revolves around four distinct
Derivative Disclosures During the Financial Crisis, 36 J. CORP. L. 1 (2010). Bartlett's case
study examines the share price of Ambac Financial, a mono-line insurance company that
insured multi-sector collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). Id. at 2-4. Despite a
considerable amount of publicly available information about Ambac's exposure to certain
CDOs, news that these CDOs had experienced multiple notch credit rating downgrades
was not reflected in Ambac's share price until they were "revealed" in subsequent
quarterly earnings announcements. Id. at 6. Bartlett attributes this inefficiency to the low
salience of individual CDOs within Ambac's portfolio and the costs of processing CDO
disclosures. Id. at 48.
31 See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 4, at 597 ("Our special interest in the
information market's economizing process is its relationship to capital market efficiency.").
32 Id. at 559 ("An efficient market response to one information set does not necessarily
mean that the market will respond efficiently to a different set."). As examined in greater
detail in subsequent sections, the fact that a market can be relatively efficient with respect
to one piece of information but not another has important implications in terms of the
mechanisms of derivatives market efficiency.
33 Id. at 560 (defining "relative efficiency" as "a measure of the speed with which new
information is reflected in price"). As Gilson and Kraakman observe, this maps squarely
onto Fama's three sub-hypotheses. See id. at 608 fig.3. The difference between the strong,
semi-strong, and weak form hypotheses is essentially the difference between markets that
incorporate information before it becomes public, as soon as it becomes public, and at
some-potentially long-point after it becomes public.
34 Indeed, this distinction has been a constant source of friction in academic debates
around market efficiency. See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient
Markets, Costly Information, and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 761, 761, 765
(1985) (observing that lawyers have often misunderstood this and other aspects of EMH).
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types of trading activity which, together,.represent the mechanisms of
market efficiency.
The first mechanism is "universally informed trading."35 Univer-
sally informed trading includes trading that takes place on the basis of
new information that is simultaneously disseminated to the entire
marketplace. 36 Writing over thirty years ago, Gilson and Kraakman
gave as examples trading activity in response to news about the results
of U.S. presidential elections or Federal Reserve policy announce-
ments.37 Today, of course, new forms of electronic communication
mean that there is a far greater volume of information that-techni-
cally at least-is costlessly and instantaneously available to the entire
marketplace. Intuitively, then, the information that provides the basis
for universally informed trading must also satisfy some sort of addi-
tional thresholds in terms of both its prominence within the universe
of available information and, ultimately, its salience in terms of the
pricing of the relevant security.38
The second and in many respects most important mechanism of
market efficiency identified by Gilson and Kraakman is "profession-
ally informed trading."39 Even where information is widely available
within the marketplace, traders may not all possess the same ability to
effectively process it. Professionally informed trading is undertaken by
firms and individuals who have made the human capital and other
investments necessary to identify which pieces of information are rele-
vant to the pricing of a given security, along with the likely impact of
this information on its market price.40 These traders can include
broker-dealers, research analysts, portfolio managers, and other insti-
tutional investors. Gilson and Kraakman see the defining character-
istic of these professionally informed traders as being the comparative
advantage they possess in terms of the production of "soft" 4 1 informa-
35 Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 4, at 568.
36 Id. Universally informed trading also includes trading on the basis of historical
information. See id. (noting that "old" information embedded in securities prices at
minimum approximates the ideal of universal dissemination).
37 Id. at 568-69.
38 Indeed, Gilson and Kraakman's examples of information that might provide the
basis for universally informed trading activity suggest as much. See also Dan Awrey,
Complexity, Innovation, and the Regulation of Modern Financial Markets, 2 HARV. Bus. L.
REv. 235, 251-53 (discussing the "opacity" of financial instruments as a driver of
complexity); Bartlett, supra note 30, at 54 (explaining that investor inattention may impair
the processing of important but low salient information).
39 Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 4, at 569.
40 Id. at 569, 594 (noting that "[e]valuation of information ... requires special skills,
such as a facility in accounting, finance or securities analysis, that can ordinarily be
obtained only through investment in expensive professional training").
41 See id. at 561.
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tion: forecasts, estimates, and other forward-looking information and
analyses. 42 This advantage means that such soft information may ini-
tially be distributed to a relatively small fraction of the marketplace-
and perhaps even just a single trader. Nevertheless, where these
traders account for a critical volume of trading activity, their trading
activities can eventually result in the broader dissemination of this
information within the marketplace and, thus, its incorporation into
security prices.43 Importantly, however, because the requisite invest-
ments in expertise are themselves costly, professionally informed
trading will only take place where traders expect to generate a profit
from these investments."
A question which logically flows from this is how the information
possessed by professionally informed traders becomes incorporated
into prices when these traders do not themselves account for a signifi-
cant proportion of overall trading activity in a security. According to
Gilson and Kraakman, the answer resides in a third mechanism of
market efficiency: "derivatively informed trading." 45 Derivatively
informed trading takes two forms.46 The first-"trade decoding" 47-
takes place when traders observe and mimic the trading activities of
other traders perceived as enjoying superior information or exper-
tise.48 Trading that takes place after an announcement that Warren
Buffett has bought or sold an equity stake in a firm is thus an example
42 Id. at 569 (describing how a small group of informed traders cause prices to reflect
semi-public information). Gilson and Kraakman's definition of "soft" information-which
essentially focuses on whether the information is about the past or future, id. at 561-is
somewhat different from the one used elsewhere in the financial intermediation literature.
This literature often defines "hard" information as being easily captured and transmitted in
numerical form, in contrast with "soft" information, which is not. See, e.g., Mitchell A.
Petersen, Information: Hard and Soft (July 2004) (unpublished manuscript), http://
www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/petersen/htm/papers/softhard.pdf.
43 As Gilson and Kraakman explain, "Subgroups of informed traders, or even a single
knowledgeable trader with sufficient resources, can also cause prices to reflect information
by persistent trading at a premium over 'uninformed' price levels." Gilson & Kraakman,
supra note 4, at 570.
44 See Paul G. Mahoney, Market Microstructure and Market Efficiency, 28 J. CORP. L.
541, 544 (2003) ("Clearly intermediaries must earn a return or they will not remain in the
market.").
45 Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 4, at 572.
46 This excludes direct, inadvertent revelation of information by professionally
informed traders. Id. at 573. More recently, a new form of derivatively informed trading
has emerged based on the analysis of order flow information (i.e., order flow decoding).
Richard K. Lyons, New Perspective on FX Markets: Order-Flow Analysis, 4 INT'L FIN. 303,
303-04 (2001). The prevailing structure of derivatives markets makes order flow decoding
more or less irrelevant for the present purposes.
47 Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 4, at 573.
48 Id. at 574.
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of trade decoding.49 As this example illustrates, trade decoding relies
on the identity of the traders, along with the details of their trading
activity, as an indirect means of signaling information to the market-
place. The second form of derivatively informed trading-"price
decoding" 50-takes place when traders observe and respond to
anonymous price and other trading information.51 In contrast with
trade decoding, price decoding does not demand that traders know
the identity of other traders. What it does demand-perhaps heroi-
cally-is that traders successfully break down all the constituent ele-
ments of price in order to determine which price movements are
driven by new information and which are driven by other (exogenous)
factors.52
Gilson and Kraakman's final mechanism of market efficiency is
"uninformed trading."5 3 The idea that uninformed traders can con-
tribute to market efficiency may seem somewhat counterintuitive.
Nevertheless, Gilson and Kraakman argue that in certain circum-
stances uninformed trading can generate aggregate forecasts that over
the long term may be better than those of any single trader.54 As
Gilson and Kraakman explain, "Although each trader's own forecasts
are skewed by the unique constraints on his or her judgment, other
traders will have offsetting constraints. As trading proceeds, the
random biases of individual forecasts will cancel one another out,
leaving price to reflect a single, best-informed aggregate forecast."55
In effect, Gilson and Kraakman view these aggregate forecasts as
a new and potentially valuable piece of information. 56 Inevitably,
however, the value of this information rests on the assumption that
biases in individual forecasts are indeed random and, thus, cancel each
49 See Gerald S. Martin & John Puthenpurackal, Imitation is the Sincerest Form of
Flattery: Warren Buffett and Berkshire Hathaway (Apr. 15, 2008) (unpublished
manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=806246 (documenting the
market reaction to the news that Buffett had purchased a given security). Interestingly,
Martin and Puthenpurackal find that the market does not fully incorporate these
announcements into prices, with the effect that investments in portfolios which mimic
Buffett's earn abnormal returns of 10.75% over the S&P 500 Index. Id.
50 Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 4, at 574.
5 Id. at 574-75.
52 See id at 578 (attributing informed traders' ability to earn a return on information to
other traders' inability to perfectly discern the cause of price movements); see also Sanford
J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets,
70 AM. ECON. REV. 393, 393-94 (1980) (describing the paradox of perfect price decoding,
which would disincentivize information gathering, and proposing an alternate model in
which uninformed traders are not perfect price decoders).
53 Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 4, at 579.
54 Id. at 580.
ss Id. at 581.
56 Id. at 580-81.
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other out.57 Where the aggregate forecasts of uninformed traders
remain biased, in contrast, the presence of uninformed traders in the
marketplace may actually serve to impede the process by which new
information becomes incorporated into prices.58
Together, Gilson and Kraakman regard these four mechanisms as
performing distinct but ultimately complementary roles in promoting
market efficiency.59 The precise combination of mechanisms will
depend on the type of information in question and the extent of its
initial distribution within the marketplace. Where information is
widely available, universally informed trading will act to incorporate
this information into prices. Where information is technically avail-
able but costly to process, meanwhile, or where it is initially available
to only a narrow subset of traders, professionally informed trading will
play an important role.60 Derivatively informed trading may then also
act to ensure that this information becomes incorporated into prices.
The net effect, according to Gilson and Kraakman, is that "[flor any
initial distribution of information in the market, including an initial
distribution to no one in the case of optimal aggregate forecasts, one
or more efficiency mechanisms facilitate the eventual 'reflection' of
information into price." 61
Gilson and Kraakman's framework has gone on to play an influ-
ential role in the policy debates around the development of fraud-on-
the-market theory under Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
Rule lOb-5, 62 the SEC's integrated disclosure and shelf prospectus
regimes,63 insider trading restrictions,64 and the regulation of the
57 Gilson and Kraakman acknowledge that this is a demanding assumption. Id. at 584.
58 Id. Uninformed trading is the least developed and convincing of Gilson and
Kraakman's four mechanisms, especially in light of the subsequent theoretical and
empirical literature exploring various biases in human decision-making. See supra note 25
and accompanying text. However, as will become apparent, understanding the role of
uninformed trading is largely irrelevant for the purposes of examining the mechanisms of
derivatives market efficiency.
59 Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 4, at 588-89.
60 Id. at 589.
61 Id. at 588-89.
62 See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, Efficient Capital Markets, the Crash, and the Fraud on the
Market Theory, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 907, 911 (1989) (relying on Gilson and Kraakman's
empirical evidence suggesting prices of actively traded securities reflect publicly available
information); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Good Finance, Bad Economics: An
Analysis of the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1059, 1083-91 (1990) (citing
Gilson and Kraakman as evidence that previous price changes cannot be used to predict
future changes).
63 See, e.g., Merritt B. Fox, Shelf Registration, Integrated Disclosure, and Underwriter
Due Diligence: An Economic Analysis, 70 VA. L. REV. 1005, 1007 (1984); Gordon &
Kornhauser, supra note 34, at 810, 818.
64 See, e.g., Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Why Should Disclosure Rules Subsidize
Informed Traders?, 16 INT'L REV. L. & EcoN. 417 (1996) (arguing that disclosure rules
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market for corporate control.65 Gilson, Kraakman, and others have
also used this framework as a basis for examining the role of under-
writers as "reputational intermediar[ies]" 66 in the context of both ini-
tial public offerings and the marketing of new financial products.67
Subsequent scholarship has expanded on this concept to examine the
economic functions of venture capital firms,68 auditors, 69 and credit
rating agencies.70 Indeed, Gilson and Kraakman's framework has
even been used as a basis for exploring the mechanisms of market
inefficiency .71
that make firm information free will improve market efficiency by assisting rationally
informed traders and reducing irrational trading); Donald C. Langevoort, Investment
Analysts and the Law of Insider Trading, 76 VA. L. REV. 1023, 1038 (1990) (noting that
Gilson and Kraakman's "derivatively informed trading" improves market efficiency by
allowing uninformed traders "to identify the insider as having an informational advantage
and react accordingly").
65 See, e.g., Guhan Subramanian, The Drivers of Market Efficiency in Revlon
Transactions, 28 J. CORP. L. 691, 693-98 (2003). Indeed, this impact has in many respects
outlived that of the EMH. See William T. Allen, Securities Markets as Social Products: The
Pretty Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis, 28 J. CORP. L. 551, 554-56 (2003) (stating that
while the EMH no longer commands the confidence it once did, Gilson and Kraakman's
work remains relevant for its foray into the institutional detail of securities markets).
66 Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 4, at 620.
67 In the context of public offerings of equity securities, for example, Gilson and
Kraakman view the status of underwriters as repeat players as enabling them to rent their
reputations to issuers as a means of credibly signaling private information. Id. at 618-21.
See generally Randolph P. Beatty & Jay R. Ritter, Investment Banking, Reputation, and the
Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings, 15 J. FIN. ECON. 213, 216-17 (1986); James R.
Booth & Richard L. Smith, II, Capital Raising, Underwriting and the Certification
Hypothesis, 15 J. FIN. ECON. 261 (1986). For a more skeptical perspective on the role of
underwriters as reputational intermediaries, see Saul Levmore, Efficient Markets and
Puzzling Intermediaries, 70 VA. L. REV. 645, 657-59, 667 (1984). See generally Anita Indira
Anand, The Efficiency of Direct Public Offerings, 7 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 433
(2003) (arguing that corporations may under certain circumstances efficiently conduct
direct public offerings without engaging an underwriter).
68 See Bernard S. Black & Ronald J. Gilson, Venture Capital and the Structure of
Capital Markets: Banks Versus Stock Markets, 47 J. FIN. ECON. 243, 254-55 (1998)
(explaining how venture capital funds leverage their reputations to promote the success of
the companies they finance).
69 See James D. Cox, The Oligopolistic Gatekeeper: The US Accounting Profession, in
AFTER ENRON: IMPROVING CORPORATE LAW AND MODERNISING SECURITIES
REGULATION IN EUROPE AND THE U.S. 295, 303-04, 304 n.22 (John Armour & Joseph A.
McCahery eds., 2006) (describing auditors' supervisory role and resultant responsibilities);
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of
Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 675 (1984) (stating that firms use outside auditors to
"convince investors of their quality").
70 See JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., The Ratings Agencies, in GATEKEEPERS: THE
PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 283, 287-88 (2006) (remarking that the
"reputational intermediary" model has long been the dominant view of the credit-rating
process).
71 Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New
Finance, 28 J. CORP. L. 635, 638 (2003).
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
1120 [Vol. 91:1104
DERIVATIVES MARKET EFFICIENCY
As with any influential theory, Gilson and Kraakman's frame-
work has also been subject to significant criticism. Alon Bray, J.B.
Heaton, Lynn Stout, and others, for example, have argued that the
framework's grounding in the EMH led Gilson and Kraakman to dis-
count the potential impact of heterogeneous expectations, decision-
making biases, and other behavioral "anomalies." 7 2 Paul Mahoney has
argued that the framework fails to account for how the institutional
structure of the trading environment can promote or impede market
efficiency.73 Allen Ferrell, meanwhile, has criticized the framework on
the basis that it fails to provide a more precise account of how dif-
ferent mechanisms contribute to market efficiency. 74 Other scholars
have raised more fundamental questions about the effectiveness of
Gilson and Kraakman's mechanisms. Jonathan Macey, for example,
has observed that both business school students and journalists-not
professionally informed traders-were the first to detect possible
fraud at energy trading firm Enron.75 Bradford De Long, Andrei
Shleifer, Lawrence Summers, and Robert Waldmann question
whether professionally informed traders are likely to engage in infor-
mationally efficient arbitrage in the presence of significant levels of
so-called "noise trading" 76-investment strategies based on beliefs,
sentiments, and other irrational considerations not driven by new
information.77
Despite these and other criticisms, Gilson and Kraakman's basic
framework has endured as an example of the important insights that
can potentially be gained by looking beyond securities prices as a
benchmark of market efficiency and instead examining the institu-
72 See, e.g., Alon Bray & J.B. Heaton, Market Indeterminacy, 28 J. CORP. L. 517,
518-20, 518 n.6 (2003); Stout, supra note 71, at 638, 649-50, 665-66.
73 Mahoney, supra note 44. Notably, Mahoney identifies specialists and other market
makers as a fifth mechanism of market efficiency which he labels "order flow informed
price setting." Id. at 542. Mahoney's mechanism shares a number of similarities with the
structurally informed traders described in Part IV.
74 Allen Ferrell, If We Understand the Mechanisms, Why Don't We Understand Their
Output?, 28 J. CORP. L. 503, 509-13 (2003) (examining why the financial economic models
underpinning Gilson and Kraakman's framework possess such low explanatory power as
measured by R').
75 Jonathan R. Macey, A Pox on Both Your Houses: Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and the
Debate Concerning the Relative Efficacy of Mandatory Versus Enabling Rules, 81 WASH.
U. L.Q. 329, 336 (2003).
76 J. Bradford De Long et al., Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets, 98 J. POL. ECON.
703, 704-05 (1990) (presenting a model in which irrational noise traders affect prices).
77 See Fischer Black, Noise, 41 J. FiN. 529 (1986) (describing different types of "noise"
and their potential impact on prices); Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, The Noise
Trader Approach to Finance, 4 J. EcoN. PERSP. 19, 23-25 (1990) (reviewing what was then
the emerging literature on the rationality and frictionless arbitrage assumptions
underpinning the EMH).
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tional arrangements within which these prices are formed and adjust
over time.78 It is in pursuit of this same objective that this Article
employs and expands upon Gilson and Kraakman's framework to
examine the mechanisms of derivatives market efficiency. However,
before embarking on this examination, it is worth briefly identifying
the principal reasons why we should care about the efficiency of deriv-
atives markets.
II
WHY WE SHOULD CARE ABOUT DERIVATIVES
MARKET EFFICIENCY
There are a number of reasons why we might care about the effi-
ciency of derivatives markets. Derivatives are bets on the direction of
future price movements.79 Insofar as derivatives prices contain valu-
able information about traders' aggregate expectations regarding
these future price movements, efficient derivatives markets can thus
improve the efficiency of the underlying markets.80 Along a similar
vein, derivatives are often utilized in order to create synthetic expo-
sures to relatively illiquid assets such as corporate bonds and
emerging market sovereign debt. They can also be used to create
exposures to entirely artificial "assets" such as baskets of securities
(e.g., the Markit ABX index)8 or financial indicators (e.g., the VIX
index). 2 In many cases, these derivatives markets may be deeper and
more liquid than the relevant underlying markets-thus making deriv-
78 See Allen, supra note 65, at 556-57 (advocating for a deeper institutional
understanding of the mechanisms that support price formation).
'9 Or, similarly, the probability that a specified future event will take place.
80 Consistent with this intuition, there is a body of empirical evidence suggesting that
prices in options and futures markets often lead those of the underlying equity or debt
markets. See, e.g., Fischer Black, Fact and Fantasy in Use of Options, 31 FIN. ANALYSTS J.
36 (1975); Lawrence Harris, S&P 500 Cash Stock Price Volatilities, 44 J. FIN. 1155, 1173
(1989); Stewart Mayhew et al., The Allocation of Informed Trading Across Related
Markets: An Analysis of the Impact of Changes in Equity-Option Margin Requirements, 50
J. FIN. 1635 (1995); see also Haibin Zhu, An Empirical Comparison of Credit Spreads
Between the Bond Market and the Credit Default Swap Market 13-14, 24-25 tbls.5 & 6
(Bank for Int'l Settlements, Working Paper No. 160, 2004), http://www.bis.org/publ/
work160.htm. Of course, the higher level of transparency in exchange-traded options and
futures markets (relative to swap markets, for example) likely offers a more
straightforward path for new derivatives price information to contribute to the price
discovery process within underlying equity and debt markets. Viewed from this
perspective, the recent regulatory reforms designed to improve swap market transparency
described in Part V may serve to enhance price discovery in underlying markets.
81 The Markit ABX index is a synthetic index whose value reflects a basket of twenty
subprime mortgage-backed securities. ABX, IHS MARKIT, https://www.markit.com/
product/abx (last visited Sept. 2, 2016).
82 Created and administered by the Chicago Board Options Exchange, the VIX index
is a measure of market participants' short-term volatility as reflected in the prices of S&P
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atives markets an important part of the process by which new infor-
mation becomes incorporated into asset prices.
The efficiency of derivatives markets can also play an important
role in promoting-or impeding-effective investor protection. The
faster new information is incorporated into prices, and the more
widely these prices are disseminated, the smaller the window of
opportunity will be for well-informed traders to exploit less knowl-
edgeable market participants. Conversely, where markets are slow to
absorb new information, this is likely to generate opportunities for
well-informed traders to exploit their informational advantage.
Insofar as the dispersion of information within the marketplace is
random and unbiased, we might not view this as a particularly
pressing problem: sometimes traders will win, sometimes they will
lose. Where the prevailing market structure serves to entrench the
informational advantage of a small number of traders, however, this
state of affairs may raise legitimate concerns regarding the more sys-
tematic exploitation of less informed market participants.
The efficiency of derivatives markets has taken on even greater
importance in light of recent regulatory proposals to supplement or
altogether replace conventional capital requirements for banks with
more market-based measures of credit risk based on derivatives
prices. Oliver Hart and Luigi Zingales, for example, have proposed
replacing capital requirements for systemically important banks with
prudential requirements based on these banks' credit default swap
(CDS) prices.83 Pursuant to this proposal, where CDS prices on a
bank's junior debt increase beyond a specified threshold, the bank
would be required to raise additional equity capital or be subject to
other prudential constraints. The desirability of Hart and Zingales's
proposal depends at least in part on how rapidly CDS markets incor-
porate new information regarding the creditworthiness of banks. The
desirability of this and other similar proposals is examined in greater
detail in Section V.E.
Finally, we might care about the efficiency of derivatives markets
because financial policymakers do. Here, it is worth noting that the
U.S. Congress has explicitly identified improving the process of "price
discovery"8 4 within derivatives markets as the primary rationale
underpinning the introduction of the new trade reporting and disclo-
500 stock index options. CBOE Volatility Index (VIX), CHICAGO BOARD OPrIONs
EXCHANGE, https://www.cboe.com/micro/vix/vixintro.aspx (last visited Sept. 2, 2016).
83 Oliver Hart & Luigi Zingales, A New Capital Regulation for Large Financial
Institutions, 13 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 453 (2011).
84 Distilled to its essence, price discovery is the process by which buyers and sellers
determine the price of an asset in the marketplace. The process of price discovery includes
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sure requirements under Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act.85 Accordingly, even if we dis-
agree with the proposition that the efficiency of derivatives markets is
important, examining the institutional arrangements that support the
process by which new information is incorporated into derivatives
prices can still provide us with useful insights into whether and to
what extent policymakers are likely to achieve their stated objectives.
The Dodd-Frank trade reporting and disclosure requirements, along
with the important question of whether they are likely to improve
price discovery within derivatives markets, are thus examined in
greater detail in Section V.A.
All this is not to suggest that informational efficiency is the only
yardstick against which the efficiency of derivatives markets can or
should be evaluated. Far from it. Indeed, as will soon become
apparent, an examination of the mechanisms of derivatives market
efficiency also raises important questions about the accuracy of deriv-
atives prices and, thus, the quality of the signal these prices send to
both market participants and regulatory authorities. Moreover, as
explored in greater detail in the next section, the "dark side" of deriv-
atives markets fits uncomfortably within an analytical framework
dedicated to understanding how new information becomes incorpo-
rated into prices. Nevertheless, approaching this examination from the
perspective of informational efficiency offers some unique insights
into the fundamental institutional differences between derivatives and
equity markets and, accordingly, why conventional frameworks for
thinking about the role of "securities" regulation-based on the domi-
nant equity-centric view-are of limited utility when attempting to
understand the challenges of regulating derivatives markets.
III
WHY DERIVATIVEs ARE DIFFERENT
The theoretical and empirical literature examining the EMH
revolves almost exclusively around the highly regulated, order-driven,
and extremely liquid markets for publicly traded stocks.86 This same
the process by and speed with which information is absorbed by a market and incorporated
into prices.
85 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 727, 124 Stat. 1376, 1696 (2010) (amending the Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C.
§ 2(a), to acknowledge that the purpose of the new trade reporting and disclosure rules is
to "enhance price discovery").
86 In a 2003 survey by Burton Malkiel, for example, fifty-one of fifty-five cited papers
on the EMH examined its application within public equity markets. Malkiel, supra note 17,
at 81-82. See infra Part IV for a survey of the relatively small body of scholarship focusing
more specifically on the informational efficiency of derivatives markets.
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equity-centric view is reflected in both Gilson and Kraakman's orig-
inal framework and the scope of its subsequent influence.87 Impor-
tantly, however, stock markets represent a relatively small fraction of
the global stock of financial assets. As of June 2015, global public
equity market capitalization stood at approximately $73.3 trillion.88
While significant, this figure nevertheless renders public equity mar-
kets smaller than both the global markets for bonds, notes, and other
fixed income debt securities ($87.7 trillion)89 and exchange-traded
options and futures ($63.4 trillion).90 While apples-to-apples compari-
sons are difficult, this figure also pales in comparison to the $553 tril-
lion global swaps market.91
A detailed examination of the institutional arrangements sup-
porting public equity and derivatives markets reveals a number of sig-
nificant differences. The most important of these differences for the
present purposes stem from the nature of the underlying contracts, the
structure of the markets in which they trade, and the sources of
market liquidity. This section examines these core differences, along
with their important implications in terms of the information, agency,
coordination, and other costs that traders in these markets are likely
to encounter. Predictably, these costs have led to the emergence of
very different mechanisms of derivatives market efficiency.
A. The Nature of the Contracts
The first important difference between equity and derivatives
markets stems from the nature of the contracts that create these
87 Notably, Gilson and Kraakman did extend their framework into debt markets-and
specifically the market for retail mortgage-backed securities (RMBS)-in a 2014 paper in
response to the financial crisis. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 8, at 331-50. However, as
we shall see, this extension did not seek to comprehensively examine the important
differences between equity and fixed income markets.
88 Domestic Market Capitalization for June 2015, WORLD FED'N EXCHANGES, http://
www.world-exchanges.org/home/index.php/statistics/monthly-reports (last visited Sept. 2,
2016) (select "Domestic Market Capitalization" data series for June 2015).
89 Summary of Debt Securities Outstanding for Q4 2015, BANK FOR INT'L
SETTLEMENTS, http://stats.bis.org/statx/srs/table/c1 (last visited Sept. 2, 2016).
90 Exchange Traded Futures and Options, by Location of Exchange for Q4 2015, BANK
FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, http://stats.bis.org/statx/srs/table/dl?p=20154&c= (last visited
Sept. 2, 2016).
91 MONETARY & ECON. DEP'T, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, OTC DERIVATIVEs
STATISTICS AT END-JuNE 2015, at 2 (2015), http://www.bis.org/publ/otchyl5l1.pdf. While
the notional amount provides a conventional measure of the size of OTC derivatives
markets, it does not capture the attendant risks. A more useful measure of size is "gross
market value," which reflects the current exposures of counterparties under open contracts
assuming that these contracts were all settled immediately. As of June 30, 2015, the Bank
for International Settlements estimated the gross market value of all outstanding OTC
derivatives at $15.5 trillion. Id.
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instruments and that define the relationship between two traders on
opposite sides of a trade.92 While these contracts vary in many impor-
tant respects, 93 there are two principal differences that stand out as
being particularly relevant from an information cost perspective. The
first is time. The transfer of legal ownership and economic risk from
one trader to another within public equity markets takes place on the
basis of something resembling a classical "spot" contract. 94 The buyer
promises to pay a price today in exchange for the delivery of a specific
number of shares, and the seller promises to deliver the shares in
exchange for payment. Viewed from this perspective, the transaction
is thus not fundamentally dissimilar from the purchase of any number
of other goods-an apple, say-which we make on a daily basis.
Importantly, these contracts envision no contractual future beyond a
very brief settlement period-typically no more than forty-eight to
seventy-two hours after the trade is executed. 95 The relationship
between the buyer and seller is thus entirely extinguished within a
matter of days, leaving the traders to go about their business com-
pletely unaffected by any subsequent changes in the creditworthiness
of their erstwhile counterparty. As a result, the identity of the traders
within public equity markets is essentially irrelevant from a con-
tracting perspective. 96
In sharp contrast, one of the core features of derivatives is their
status as "neoclassical" executory contracts that contemplate the per-
formance of obligations by one or both traders over time.97 Under a
typical swap contract, for example, both traders will owe contingent
92 Notably, in the case of equity securities, the contract creating the legal instrument is
separate from the contract that facilitates its transfer from one trader to another. In the
case of derivatives, in contrast, a single contract both creates the instrument and,
conceptually at least, facilitates the "transfer" of economic risk.
93 Kate Judge, for example, has observed that the perpetual nature of equity securities
means that their economic value can only be realized by selling them on a secondary
market. Judge, supra note 14, at 9. As we shall see, derivatives markets are not
characterized by the existence of the same type of secondary markets.
94 See Ian R. Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691, 720-21
(1974).
95 See, e.g., Press Release, Euronext, Introduction of T+2 Standard Settlement
Lifecycle (Jan. 14, 2014), http://www.nyxdata.com/nysedata/Default.aspx?tablD=993&id=
2314 (announcing transition from a three-day to two-day settlement cycle). At the same
time, any residual credit risk is effectively eliminated by virtue of the operation of the
delivery-versus-payment settlement systems employed by stock exchanges.
96 See Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of
Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233, 236 (1979) (discussing the implications of
Macneil's typology from a transaction cost perspective). This is not to suggest that the
identity of the traders may not be relevant from a pricing perspective. As described in Part
IV, the identity of a trader is very relevant indeed for the purposes of effective trade
decoding.
97 See id. at 237-38 (describing the characteristics of such neoclassical contracts).
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obligations toward one another over a period that may span several
years. Rather than contemplating the simple purchase of an apple at
your local supermarket, these contracts are thus analogous to an
enforceable obligation to continue to buy and sell apples at today's
prices on a periodic basis for several years into the future. Impor-
tantly, the duration of these contracts introduces the risk that a trader
may become insolvent or default between the moment of execution
and the complete performance of its contractual obligations. The pros-
pect of insolvency or default, in turn, makes the creditworthiness-
and thus the identity-of the traders highly relevant from a con-
tracting perspective. Accordingly, while we might not care very much
about the identity of the buyer when we sell 100 shares of Apple Inc.
on the NASDAQ, we might care very deeply about the identity of the
trader with whom we enter into a five-year total return swap for the
purposes of taking a short position in the very same shares.
The second important difference in terms of the nature of the
contracts is the degree of heterogeneity. Each common share of Apple
Inc. is legally and economically identical. At the same time, stock
exchanges such as the NASDAQ have historically provided a form of
standardized private law governing, for example, issuer disclosure
obligations, capital structure, governance, and the transfer of securi-
ties.98 While much of this private law has now been supplanted by
public regulation, the effect has nevertheless been to inject a fairly
high degree of standardization or homogeneity into both publicly
traded shares and the legal and institutional environment in which
they trade.99
Derivatives, in contrast, can exhibit a relatively high degree of
economic and legal heterogeneity. From an economic standpoint,
derivatives can be engineered by traders to create any conceivable
combination of risk and return, from the price of Apple shares to the
98 See Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O'Hara, The Economics of Stock Exchange
Listing Fees and Listing Requirements, 11 J. FIrN. INTERMEDIATION 297, 299-300 (2002)
(describing the evolution of the economic role of stock exchanges and their governance);
Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O'Hara, Regulating Exchanges and Alternative Trading
Systems: A Law and Economics Perspective, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 17, 22 (1999) (describing
the bundle of products provided by stock exchanges); Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange as
Regulator, 83 VA. L. REv. 1453, 1462 (1997) (expanding Gilson and Kraakman's analysis
to include more detailed issues around equity market microstructure).
99 Notably, elements of this homogeneity-and specifically the institutional
environment in which trading takes place-are in the process of being eroded by the
emergence of alternative trading systems as important competitors to conventional stock
exchanges. For an overview of these systems and their impact on the equity trading
environment, see Merritt B. Fox et al., The New Stock Market: Sense and Nonsense, 65
DUKE L.J. 191 (2015) (analyzing the market effects of new equity trading practices and
evaluating proposed reforms).
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price of apples. From a legal standpoint, the existence of idiosyncratic
counterparty credit risk, differences in legal rules across jurisdictions,
and the absence of coordination mechanisms equivalent to a stock
exchange might be expected to lead to considerable divergence in
terms of the underlying contractual architecture.
Crucially, this heterogeneity can even be observed in connection
with the "purchase" and subsequent "sale" of a single derivative expo-
sure by a single trader. Specifically, where the exposure-a long posi-
tion in the shares of Apple, for example-is acquired under a
derivatives contract with one counterparty subject to the laws of one
jurisdiction, and later shifted under a contract with another
counterparty subject to the laws of another jurisdiction, the trader will
actually find itself a counterparty to two separate contracts, subject to
the laws of two jurisdictions, and exposed to the default of two
counterparties with potentially different credit risk profiles. The result
is a complex and constantly changing web of market and counterparty
exposures.
Time and heterogeneity have an important impact on the infor-
mation costs encountered by derivatives traders. First, the duration of
derivatives contracts-along with the corresponding exposure to
counterparty default or insolvency-generate powerful incentives for
traders to invest in ex ante screening in order to determine the
creditworthiness of their prospective counterparties. It also incen-
tivizes them to engage in ex post monitoring of their counterparties
over the life of a derivatives contract. These investments in screening
and monitoring can be very costly. The idiosyncratic nature of these
investments means that they may also be largely non-recoverable (i.e.,
sunk). 00 Intuitively, we might expect these investments to be particu-
larly costly where the counterparties are large, complex financial insti-
tutions. This intuition finds support in the empirical research of
Donald Morgan, who finds an unusual pattern of disagreement-or
"splits"-between credit rating agencies over the ratings of banks and
insurance firms.101 Morgan attributes this disagreement to the high
costs of observing the quality of these firms' assets and the nature of
their trading activities.102
100 See Williamson, supra note 96, at 239-45 (examining the role of transaction costs in
determining the optimal governance structure-that is, markets or firms-in economic
affairs).
101 Donald P. Morgan, Rating Banks: Risk and Uncertainty in an Opaque Industry, 92
AM. ECON. REv. 874 (2002).
102 Id. at 874 (finding that bond-rating agencies disagree more if bank risk is harder to
observe).
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Second, contractual heterogeneity means that it may be difficult
to disentangle the stated price of a derivatives contract from its full
economic price. In this context, the full economic price can be under-
stood as incorporating any non-price terms that impose opportunity or
other costs on contracting parties. An example may help illustrate this
point. A derivatives dealer may quote Apple Inc. and Diana's
Homemade Apple Pie Stand the same price on a five-year interest
rate swap. Reflecting the significant difference in counterparty credit
risk, however, the dealer may require Diana to post more or higher
quality collateral as security against the performance of her future
obligations.103 The dealer may also subject Diana to more intensive
monitoring, or impose stricter contractual triggers governing, for
example, the circumstances in which she will be required to post addi-
tional collateral in response to changes in interest rates or her own
creditworthiness.
The imposition of these more burdensome contractual terms
serves to increase the economic price of the contract from Diana's
perspective, even though the stated price may be identical to that
between the dealer and Apple Inc. Matters become even more com-
plicated once we introduce the (perhaps more realistic) possibility that
the dealer might initially quote Diana a higher stated price on the
basis of its initial evaluation of her creditworthiness, or its expecta-
tions in terms of the volume of future business likely to be generated
by this new relationship. Similarly, it may be possible for Diana to
negotiate less onerous contractual terms in exchange for agreeing to
an increase in the stated price, or by moving her savings account, com-
mercial loans, or insurance to the dealer or its affiliates. 104 At the
same time, if Diana and Apple Inc. enter into contracts with the
dealer at different times, differences in the stated price may reflect
changes in the dealer's assessment of market risk and not the relative
creditworthiness of its counterparties.
What this example illustrates is that-in the absence of relatively
granular information about the identity of the counterparties, their
broader relationship, creditworthiness, and economically important
contractual terms-it can be difficult for traders to isolate whether
observed changes in the market price of a derivatives contract are
being driven by changes in market risk, counterparty credit risk, bar-
gaining power, or other (potentially exogenous) factors. As depicted
103 These differences in contractual terms may also reflect relative differences in
bargaining power between Diana and Apple Inc.
104 A dealer may especially be inclined to negotiate less onerous terms when this results
in the dealer being able to secure more collateral against Diana's obligations under the
swap. See infra Section IV.C (discussing collateral regimes).
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in Figure 1, the full economic price of a derivatives contract is thus
analogous to an iceberg, with a number of potentially significant
pricing variables hidden or distorted beneath the surface.
FIGURE 1
Stated Price The "Bright Side"
Counterparty Credit Risk
Amount of Collateralization
Quality of Collateral
Collateral Triggers
The "Dark Side"
formal Monitoring
Other Economically Important
Contractual Terms
Broader Relationship
Between Counterparties
Figure 1 also helps demarcate the boundary between the "bright"
and "dark" sides of a derivatives contract. The bright side consists of
an exposure to changes in the value of an underlying asset, or the
probability of an expected future payoff. This exposure is commonly
referred to as "market risk." In many cases, the price of this under-
lying asset-shares in Apple Inc., for example' 05-will be sensitive to
the revelation of new information. As a corollary, we would expect
any new information to also eventually find its way into the price of
derivatives contracts that create an exposure to this underlying.
Indeed, as we shall see, this information may even be incorporated
into derivatives prices before it is reflected in the price of the under-
lying.' 06 Where this is the case, we would expect the stated price of
executed trades to signal potentially valuable information to the mar-
ketplace about traders' expectations regarding future price move-
ments, thereby theoretically opening the door for efficiency-enhancing
105 While equity securities offer a relatively straightforward example for the present
purposes, there remains an important question concerning how far we can extend this to
other asset classes. This question is examined in greater detail in Part IV.
106 See infra notes 135-37 and accompanying text (citing studies concluding that
derivatives markets and prices exhibit fluctuations reflecting reactions to new information
earlier than corresponding anticipatory or reactionary shifts in stock prices, bond prices,
and credit rating announcements).
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trade and price decoding. Importantly, the fact that information
regarding recently executed trades is likely to be relevant to the price
of both subsequent derivatives contracts and the underlying means
that conventional regulatory strategies such as post-trade trans-
parency may serve to enhance informational efficiency. 0
The dark side of a derivatives contract consists of the exposure of
each trader to the default or insolvency of its counterparty. As
described in greater detail in Section IV.C, traders employ a number
of mechanisms to manage this idiosyncratic counterparty credit risk.
The most important of these mechanisms include closeout netting and
the posting of financial collateral. As we shall see, these mechanisms
are theoretically designed to act as substitutes for investments by
traders in new information about the creditworthiness of their
counterparties, thus leaving them in what Bengt Holmstrom has cha-
racterized as a "blissful state of 'symmetric ignorance."' 08 Impor-
tantly, the role of these mechanisms in creating an equilibrium in
which mutual ignorance can be used to overcome potential adverse
selection problems does not fit squarely within Gilson and
Kraakman's framework. The centrality of these mechanisms to the
operation of derivatives markets also calls into question the likely
effectiveness of conventional regulatory strategies as a means of
enhancing informational efficiency. 0 9
The bundling of market and idiosyncratic counterparty credit risk
within a derivatives contract has potentially significant implications in
terms of the informational content of derivatives prices. Perhaps most
importantly, despite its clear economic importance, the dark side of a
derivatives contract may or may not be reflected in the stated price.
As a result, stated prices may send a potentially ambiguous-or
"noisy"-signal to other traders. Amongst other implications, this
noise adds to the already significant obstacles to efficiency-enhancing
trade and price decoding, thus rendering such decoding costlier, and
ultimately less likely, within derivatives markets.
As described in greater detail in Part IV, the information costs
generated by time and economic and legal heterogeneity can ulti-
107 See Judge, supra note 14, at 15-17 (discussing the use of share-price information).
The potential impact of these strategies is examined in greater detail in Section V.A.
108 Bengt Holmstrom, Understanding the Role of Debt in the Financial System 6 (Bank
for Int'l Settlements, Working Paper No. 479, 2015), http://www.bis.org/publ/work479.htm;
see also Judge, supra note 14, at 12 (discussing Holmstrom's view on the opacity of money
markets). While Holmstrom was writing in relation to money markets, the dynamics of the
operation of closeout netting and financial collateral very much mirror those of money,
and specifically, repo markets.
109 For an excellent discussion of the limits of conventional securities law strategies in
the context of banking and money markets, see Judge, supra note 14.
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mately help us better understand the role of dealers as reputational
intermediaries within derivatives markets, along with the role played
by organizations such as ISDA in promoting greater contractual
standardization. These costs can also help us understand the drivers
behind the development of specialized netting and collateral mecha-
nisms that, by minimizing the exposure of traders in the event of
counterparty default, serve as potential substitutes for investments in
counterparty screening and monitoring. At the same time, the obser-
vation that derivatives contracts consist of both a bright and dark side
serves to distinguish them from publicly traded stocks. This difference
exposes the limits of Gilson and Kraakman's framework and raises a
host of important and largely unanswered questions about the optimal
role of regulation within derivatives markets.
B. The Structure of the Markets
The second important difference between equity securities and
derivatives relates to the structure of the markets in which they trade.
Historically, the vast majority of trading within public equity markets
has taken place on order-driven exchanges such as the New York,
London, or Tokyo Stock Exchanges. In recent years, a significant frac-
tion of trading has also taken place on so-called "alternative" trading
platforms such as BATS, Turquoise, and Chi-X.1"0 Exchanges and
alternative trading platforms perform an important role in the aggre-
gation and dissemination of information about the prevailing "bid"
and "asking" prices for different equity securities,11 ' along with the
publication of information about the price and volume of executed
trades. NASDAQ's public website, for example, provides real time
information about the best available bid and asking prices for shares
of Apple Inc., in addition to price and volume information for indi-
vidual trades.112
Exchanges and alternative trading platforms also play an impor-
tant role in establishing the rules pursuant to which these trades take
place. Stock exchanges, for example, typically impose order-matching
and trade-pricing rules. Order-matching rules ensure that the best
110 As of 2013, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission estimated that 11.31% (by
dollar volume) and 12.12% (by share volume) of trading in U.S. public equities had
migrated to such alternative trading platforms. Laura Tuttle, Alternative Trading Systems:
Description of ATS Trading in National Market System Stocks 2 (SEC Div. of Econ. &
Risk Analysis, White Paper, Oct. 2013), http://www.sec.gov/marketstructure/research/alter
native-trading-systems-march-2014.pdf.
111 The "bid" price represents the maximum price that a buyer is willing to pay for an
asset. The "ask" price represents the minimum price at which a seller is willing to sell it.
112 NASDAQ Last Sale (NLS) Intraday Trade History: Apple Inc. (AAPL), NASDAQ,
http://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/aapl/time-sales (last visited Sept. 2, 2016).
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(highest) bid is matched with the best (lowest) asking price, thereby
incentivizing both buyers and sellers to submit competitive orders and
ensuring that no traders receive preferential treatment.113 Trade-
pricing rules then determine the price at which the resulting trades are
executed, cleared, and settled.114 Exchanges and alternative trading
platforms can thus be viewed as valuable coordination mechanisms,
aggregating and disseminating information about security prices and
other trading information, bringing together buyers and sellers in the
marketplace, and providing a common legal and institutional environ-
ment for trading in equity securities.
One of the defining characteristics of derivatives markets, in con-
trast, has historically been the absence of a coordination mechanism
equivalent to an exchange or alternative trading platform. Unlike
equity markets, there is no publicly available source where Diana of
the eponymous apple pie stand, for example, could go to find the cur-
rent bid and asking prices for a five-year interest rate swap, or infor-
mation regarding recently executed trades. In theory, Diana would
therefore need to somehow construct her own dataset of historical
prices. She would also need to interact with a number of other traders
in order to aggregate information about the range of current bid and
asking prices. Compounding matters, in the absence of a market struc-
ture that brought together prospective buyers and sellers, Diana
would need to take it upon herself to identify other traders willing to
take the opposite side of the trade. Depending on how idiosyncratic
her needs were in terms of the denominated currency of the swap, its
duration, and other features, the costs of identifying these traders
could be very significant. Viewed in isolation, then, the absence of an
exchange or equivalent coordination mechanism can be seen as
increasing the search and other information costs for Diana and other
traders within derivatives markets.
Public equity markets provide a useful benchmark against which
to compare the information and other costs that traders are likely to
encounter within derivatives markets. At the same time, this compar-
ison risks giving the misleading impression that derivatives markets
are somehow completely unstructured. In practice, derivatives mar-
kets are loosely organized around a relatively small group of large
traders known as "dealers." Prominent derivatives dealers include
Citigroup, JP Morgan, Goldman Sachs, Deutsche Bank, and HSBC.
More recently, large asset managers such as BlackRock have also
113 See LARRY HARRis, TRADING AND EXCHANGES: MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE FOR
PRACTITIONERS 116-20 (2003) (describing rule-based order-matching systems).
114 See id. at 120 (describing the three most common trade-pricing rules).
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started acting as derivatives dealers.1' 5 These dealers quote bid and
asking prices to other traders on the basis that they are willing to take
either side of the contemplated trade.116 For example, JP Morgan
might quote Diana a bid of 5.00% and an ask of 5.05% on the fixed
leg of a five-year U.S. dollar interest rate swap. In this example, the
bid represents the gross interest rate Diana would receive if she were
to elect to take the fixed leg of the swap, and the ask represents the
rate she would pay if she were to take the variable or "floating" leg. 117
Dealers will then typically look to hedge their exposures under the
resulting trade by seeking out and entering into one or more offsetting
swaps with other traders or, in many cases, other dealers. In theory at
least, dealers thus attempt to profit not by placing bets on the future
direction of prices, but by charging a fee-typically embedded in the
spread between the quoted bid (e.g., 5.00%) and asking (e.g., 5.05%)
prices-for their willingness to stand on the opposite side of the trade.
Where permitted, of course, dealers may also enter into proprietary
trades on the basis of their expectations regarding future price
movements.
The important role played by dealers in reducing search and
other information costs within derivatives markets is examined in
greater detail in Part V. At the same time, the dealer-intermediated
structure of derivatives markets is also the source of potentially signif-
icant costs. Perhaps most importantly, the absence of a mechanism for
aggregating and publicly disseminating prices and other trading infor-
mation has historically presented a significant obstacle for traders
such as Diana's Homemade Apple Pie Stand seeking to determine the
best available price.s18 The resulting market opacity puts dealers in an
advantageous informational position vis-A-vis other market partici-
pants, theoretically enabling them to exploit their less informed cli-
ents.119 The prospect of exploitation is magnified insofar as dealers are
115 See Dan McCrum & Michael Mackenzie, BlackRock Looks to Take On Wall Street,
FIN. TIMEs (Apr. 12, 2012, 6:50 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4112b7dc-84b0-11el-a3c5-
00144feab49a.html.
116 See Dan Awrey, The Limits of Private Ordering Within Modern Financial Markets,
34 REv. BANKING & FIN. L. 183, 202 (2014-2015) (describing the role of dealers in making
markets in OTC derivatives). These quotes can take the form of either binding or
indicative (non-binding) quotes.
117 In this example, the floating leg would typically be fixed at a benchmark rate (for
example, Libor) plus a specified number of percentage (or "basis") points (for example,
+2.0%).
18 To drive home this point, compare the ease with which it is possible to find the
current price of Apple shares using a simple online search with the difficulty of obtaining
similar publicly available information from a total return swap on these shares.
119 For a theoretical framework for understanding how the opaque, dealer-
intermediated markets can generate opportunities for exploitation, see Albert S. Kyle,
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compelled to make idiosyncratic, relationship-specific investments in
understanding their clients' business and evaluating counterparty
credit risk.120 These investments can be viewed as giving incumbent
dealers (who already have a relationship with a client) a comparative
informational advantage over potential competitors (who would theo-
retically need to factor these investments into their quoted prices),
thereby undermining vigorous price competition.
C. The Sources of Market Liquidity
The divergent structures of public equity and derivatives markets
expose a third important difference: the sources of market liquidity.
The concept of liquidity is extremely abstract and, thus, difficult to
define with any real precision. 121 At a very basic level, however,
liquidity can be understood as measuring a trader's ability to execute a
trade rapidly and with minimal price impact.122 It is thus a function of
both the amount of time it takes to buy or sell a security and the effect
of the trade on that security's price. Conventional measures of market
liquidity include the number (or "depth") of buyers and sellers in the
marketplace, the number (or "volume") of executed trades, and the
size of prevailing spreads between bid and asking prices.1 23
Stock exchanges promote market liquidity in two primary
ways.124 First, the very existence of an exchange can be understood as
Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading, 53 ECONOMETRICA 1315 (1985). For a sense of
some of the ways in which this exploitation might manifest itself in practice, see, for
example, the UK Financial Conduct Authority's recent review uncovering widespread mis-
selling of certain interest rate derivatives. Interest Rate Hedging Products (IRHP), FIN.
CONDUcT AUTH. (June 11, 2016), http://www.fca.org.uk/consumers/financial-services-
products/banking/interest-rate-hedging-products (last visited Aug. 22, 2016).
120 Relationship-specific investments can be understood as investments of time, effort,
or other resources, the payoffs from which depend on the continuation of a given
relationship. See Vincent P. Crawford, Relationship-Specific Investment, 105 Q.J. ECON.
561, 561 (1990) (defining relationship-specific investment as an investment whose returns
depend on the relationship's continuation).
121 See Sanford J. Grossman & Merton H. Miller, Liquidity and Market Structure, 43 J.
FIN. 617, 617 (1988) (demonstrating the difficulty of defining liquidity in precise
mathematical terms).
122 Markus Brunnermeier and Lasse Pedersen refer to this type of liquidity, which
essentially measures the ease with which a financial instrument can be traded, as "market
liquidity." Markus K. Brunnermeier & Lasse Heje Pedersen, Market Liquidity and
Funding Liquidity, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 2201, 2201 (2009) (defining market liquidity).
123 Tarun Chordia et al., Market Liquidity and Trading Activity, 56 J. FIN. 501, 502
(2001).
124 See HARRIS, supra note 113 (describing the microstructure of public equity markets);
Daniel R. Fischel & Sanford J. Grossman, Customer Protection in Futures and Securities
Markets, 4 J. FUTURES MKTS. 273 (1984) (examining the private rules and institutions that
have evolved to protect customers in public equity and futures markets); J. Harold
Mulherin et al., Prices are Property: The Organization of Financial Exchanges from a
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an important source of market liquidity. The aggregation and dissemi-
nation of trading information, combined with the production of rules
governing the trading environment, serve to reduce information costs
for traders and ameliorate potential adverse selection and agency
problems. The amelioration of adverse selection and agency problems
increases the confidence of traders in the integrity of the marketplace,
thereby attracting buyers and sellers and increasing the depth and
volume of trade. Greater depth and volume of trading activity then
serves to enhance the process of price discovery, resulting in narrower
spreads between bid and asking prices. 125 More traders, executing
more trades, at narrower bid-ask spreads can then be understood as
generating greater market liquidity. Greater liquidity, in turn, attracts
more market participants-increasing the depth and volume of trade,
enhancing price discovery, reducing spreads, and generating still
greater liquidity.1 26
Secondly, stock exchanges also utilize more bespoke mechanisms
to promote market liquidity.'27 For example, many exchanges use call
market auctions at the start of a trading session or following a halt in
trading. Rather than matching orders as they are entered, call markets
allow for the accumulation of buy and sell orders for a specified
period of time before they are matched, priced, executed, cleared, and
settled. 12 By allowing order flow to build up in this way, call markets
can be understood as aggregating market liquidity. For this reason,
some exchanges also use call markets for trading in thinly traded
stocks. 129 Along a similar vein, many exchanges impose an affirmative
obligation on designated exchange members-historically referred to
as "specialists" 30-to maintain fair and orderly markets in specific
securities. These specialists use their own balance sheets to intervene
in the marketplace during periods of illiquidity, buying where there is
Transaction Cost Perspective, 34 J.L. & ECON. 591 (1991) (examining the evolution of
private rules governing U.S. stock exchanges).
125 See Mulherin et al., supra note 124, at 593-94 (describing how exchanges alleviate
the costs of price discovery).
126 For this reason, it is often said that "liquidity begets liquidity." See THIERRY
FOUCAULT ET AL., MARKET LIQUIDITY: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND POLICY 310 (2013).
127 HARRIS, supra note 113.
128 See id. at 91 (discussing the mechanics of call markets).
129 Id.
130 Notably, the lexicon of equity market making is changing in this regard. The New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE), for example, has recently replaced "specialists" with
Designated Market Makers (DMMs). Like specialists, DMMs have an affirmative
obligation to maintain fair and orderly markets in their designated securities. The NYSE
has also recently introduced a new category of market maker known as Supplemental
Liquidity Providers (SLPs). SLPs receive financial incentives from the NYSE in exchange
for creating liquidity in their designated securities. Market Model, NYSE, https://
www.nyse.com/market-model/overview (last visited July 2, 2016).
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a scarcity of demand (bids), and selling where there is a scarcity of
supply (asks).13 Exchanges can thus be viewed as important sources
of market liquidity. Importantly, this liquidity exists independently of
the traders that collectively make up the marketplace. As a result, we
would not generally expect the failure of one or more important
traders-or their unwillingness to trade-to have a significant impact
on market liquidity.
The sources of liquidity within derivatives markets are the largest
and most important market participants: dealers. As of June 2010, the
fourteen largest derivatives dealers-the so-called "G14"-were
counterparties to swaps representing approximately 82% of the global
notional amount outstanding.1 32 Given this concentration of trading
activity, liquidity within derivatives markets is essentially a function of
the capacity and incentives of this relatively small network of traders
to perform this important market-making role. This leaves derivatives
markets acutely vulnerable to the withdrawal of liquidity by dealers.
Broadly speaking, there are at least three reasons why dealers might
conceivably withdraw from derivatives market-making. First, where a
dealer's balance sheet is under pressure, it may withdraw from
market-making on the basis that it is not presently able to bear the
relevant market, counterparty credit, or other risks.1 33 Insofar as this
pressure is isolated to a single dealer, however, we would not expect
this to undermine broader market liquidity as other dealers will likely
stand ready to step into this dealer's shoes and absorb its market
share. Second, during periods of broader market disruption, dealers
may take the view that it is not prudent or profitable to enter into new
derivatives trades-either because they think they cannot effectively
price or manage the relevant risks, or because they wish to insulate
their balance sheets from the effects of a possible crisis. Third, dealers
may withdraw from derivatives market-making where these activities
no longer generate a sufficient return on capital. As examined in Part
V, the correlated withdrawal of liquidity by dealers could have a sig-
nificant impact on the informational efficiency of derivatives markets.
There are perhaps many other reasons why we might view public
equity securities and derivatives as fundamentally different species of
131 HARRIS, supra note 113, at 494 (describing specialist obligations).
132 See DAVID MENGLE, INT'L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES Ass'N, CONCENTRATION OF OTC
DERIVATIVES AMONG MAJOR DEALERS 2 (2010), http://www2.isda.org/functional-areas/
research/research-notes/page/3. The G14 is comprised of Bank of America, Barclays, BNP
Paribas, Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, HSBC, JP Morgan
Chase, Morgan Stanley, Royal Bank of Scotland, Soci6t6 Gdndrale, UBS, and Wells Fargo.
Id. at 2 n.2.
133 Although this may actually exacerbate balance sheet problems insofar as it sends a
signal to the market that the dealer's balance sheet is under pressure.
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financial instruments. The pricing models used to value derivatives,
for example, are often far more sophisticated than those used to value
equity securities. For this and other reasons, many jurisdictions signifi-
cantly restrict the extent to which the general public can directly par-
ticipate in derivatives markets-thereby reducing the prospect of both
universally informed and uninformed trading. These other differences
may have important implications in terms of the relative information
and other costs encountered by traders within these markets. Never-
theless, in the next section we confine our examination to four poten-
tial mechanisms of market efficiency that have emerged in response to
the unique costs stemming from the nature of derivatives contracts,
the structure of the markets in which they trade, and the sources of
market liquidity.
IV
THE MECHANISMS OF DERIVATIVES MARKET EFFICIENCY
As described in the previous section, traders within derivatives
markets face potentially significant information, agency, coordination,
and other costs not generally encountered within public equity mar-
kets. These costs stem from the need to identify potential counterpar-
ties and then screen for and monitor counterparty credit risk over the
life of a derivatives contract. They also stem from the economic and
legal heterogeneity of derivatives contracts and the opaque dealer-
intermediated structure of derivatives markets. Against this backdrop,
it may at first glance seem remarkable that available empirical evi-
dence suggests that derivatives markets are often relatively informa-
tionally efficient. While this evidence is relatively modest in
comparison with the voluminous research examining the EMH in rela-
tion to public equity markets, it suggests that-at least with respect to
certain types of information-some derivatives markets appear to be
more sensitive to the revelation of new information than public equity
markets. Using news reflected in stock prices as a benchmark for pub-
licly available information, Viral Acharya and Timothy Johnson, for
example, find that CDS prices react to negative credit information in a
manner consistent with the use of nonpublic information by relation-
ship or "insider" banks.134 Lars Norden and Martin Weber similarly
find that CDS markets react more rapidly to potential credit rating
downgrades than equity markets.135 Other studies have found that
134 Viral V. Acharya & Timothy C. Johnson, Insider Trading in Credit Derivatives, 84 J.
FIN. EcoN. 110, 112 (2007).
135 Lars Norden & Martin Weber, Informational Efficiency of Credit Default Swap and
Stock Markets: The Impact of Credit Rating Announcements, 28 J. BANKING & FIN. 2813,
2838 (2004) [hereinafter Norden & Weber, Informational Efficiency]. But see Lars Norden
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CDS markets lead both bond markets13 6 and credit rating agencies' 37
in reacting to negative news about the creditworthiness of corporate
debt issuers. The salient question thus becomes: How exactly does this
new information become incorporated into derivatives prices?
This section identifies and examines four potential mechanisms of
derivatives market efficiency: dealers, interdealer brokers and ECNs,
specialized netting and collateral mechanisms, and contractual stan-
dardization under the aegis of organizations such as ISDA. Impor-
tantly, these mechanisms are not put forward as substitutes for those
identified by Gilson and Kraakman. Indeed, in many cases, these
mechanisms may work in tandem with the mechanisms of equity
market efficiency. This will particularly be the case where institutional
investors-Gilson and Kraakman's professionally informed traders-
use derivatives as a more cost-effective way of creating an exposure to
an underlying equity security.' 38 By the same token, however, the
mechanisms of derivatives market efficiency often operate in very dif-
ferent ways from the mechanisms that Gilson and Kraakman argue
serve to incorporate new information into prices within public equity
markets. These differences reflect the nature of derivatives contracts,
the structure of the markets in which they trade, and the sources of
market liquidity.
A. Dealers
As described in Part III, derivatives markets are loosely organ-
ized around a relatively small network of global dealers. In order to
better understand the central role of dealers within derivatives mar-
kets, it may be useful to take a step back and examine the emergence
of these markets in historical context. The origins of modern deriva-
tives markets can be traced back to the introduction of the Bretton
Woods system of monetary and exchange rate management.139 Estab-
lished in 1944, the Bretton Woods system imposed strict capital con-
& Martin Weber, The Co-Movement of Credit Default Swap, Bond and Stock Markets: An
Empirical Analysis, 15 EUROPEAN FIN. MGMT. 529, 530 (2009).
136 Roberto Blanco et al., An Empirical Analysis of the Dynamic Relation Between
Investment-Grade Bonds and Credit Default Swaps, 60 J. FIN. 2255, 2256 (2005).
137 John Hull et al., The Relationship Between Credit Default Swap Spreads, Bond
Yields, and Credit Rating Announcements, 28 J. BANKING & FIN. 2789, 2809 (2004).
138 Thus, for example, an institutional investor could use a total return equity swap to
create an exposure to an underlying stock. This might be less costly than simply purchasing
the underlying shares where (1) the market for the underlying was relatively illiquid or (2)
the purchase would send valuable information to other market participants, giving rise to
trade decoding, and increasing the price of the stock before the institutional investor was
able to acquire the desired amount of stock.
139 For a more detailed history, see PERRY MEHRLING, THE NEw LOMBARD STREET:
How THE FED BECAME THE DEALER OF LAST RESORT 71-75 (2011).
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trols designed to prevent the flight of capital from jurisdictions
pursuing relatively tight monetary and macroeconomic policies to
jurisdictions pursuing more accommodating policies.1 40 In effect, these
capital controls restricted the amount of money that could be moved
across international borders.
So-called "parallel loans"-the predecessor of modern swaps-
emerged as a means of circumventing these controls.141 Parallel loans
worked as follows. Imagine that Diana's Homemade Apple Pie Stand,
domiciled in the UK, required Yen in order to finance the expansion
of its burgeoning Japanese subsidiary. Under the Bretton Woods
system, Diana's ability to make this investment directly would be
severely restricted. However, if Diana could find a Japanese firm that
needed Pound Sterling, she could arrange for two parallel loans: one
from the Japanese firm to Diana's Japanese subsidiary denominated in
Yen, and the other from Diana to the Japanese firm's UK subsidiary
denominated in Sterling (see Figure 2).142 While these parallel loans
would together be economically equivalent to foreign direct invest-
ment, no money would cross international borders-thus ensuring
that the letter of Bretton Woods, if not its spirit, was strictly observed.
140 The rationale being that, in the absence of such controls, capital would flow to
whichever jurisdictions offered the best investment prospects as measured by future
growth potential and the cost of capital. While in a floating exchange rate regime we might
expect such international capital flows to be reflected in prevailing exchange rates, the
Bretton Woods's pegged exchange rate regime prevented currencies from adjusting to fully
reflect these flows. For a general discussion of capital controls, see Christopher J. Neely,
An Introduction to Capital Controls, FED. RES. BANK ST. Louis REv., Nov.-Dec. 1999, at
13.
141 MEHRLING, supra note 139, at 72-75 (describing how parallel loans were used to
circumvent national controls).
142 In reality, the funds for these loans would typically be borrowed by the parent firm
from a financial institution located in the relevant jurisdiction.
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(parent)
GBD Loan
Japan
(subsidiary)
Dealers performed two important functions in the market for
parallel loans. First, dealers assist clients like Diana in identifying
potential counterparties willing to take the opposite side of a trade.
Dealers were in an advantageous position to perform this role for sev-
eral reasons. As a preliminary matter, dealers were typically large
commercial and investment banks whose business it was to under-
stand their clients' business models, financing needs, and creditworthi-
ness. This included understanding the geographic footprint of their.
clients' commercial activities and their corresponding demand for
financing in foreign currencies. Dealers could then leverage their large
client networks in different jurisdictions to match firms whose demand
for financing in foreign currency corresponded with one another.
Dealers thus played a central role in the aggregation of information
about the supply and demand for foreign currency financing in the
form of parallel loans, thereby significantly reducing the search costs
for firms looking to identify potentially suitable counterparties. As
reflected in the composition of the current G14,1 4 3 the resulting
economy of scope gave large cross-border banks a comparative advan-
tage in making markets in parallel loans.
Second, dealers played a crucial role in the intermediation of par-
allel loans. In our example, both Diana's Homemade Apple Pie Stand
and the Japanese firm may initially possess very little information
about one another. They may also not have the expertise or other
143 See MENGLE, supra note 132, at 2 n.2.
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resources necessary to effectively screen or monitor the creditworthi-
ness of their counterparties. These problems leave both parties
extremely vulnerable to counterparty default and opportunism. Per-
haps most importantly, in the event that one of the counterparties
were to become insolvent, or if it were to opportunistically seek to
prematurely terminate one side of the parallel loan, the other
counterparty would potentially be left struggling to find a replacement
counterparty before it ran out of Yen or Pound Sterling liquidity. The
possibility that any new parallel loan entered into under these adverse
circumstances might be on less advantageous terms than the original
contract is often referred to as "replacement risk."
One way to address these problems is by contractually inter-
posing a dealer that will then lend the UK and Japanese parents the
Pound Sterling and Yen necessary for the purpose of extending the
loans to each subsidiary (see Figure 3).144 While the dealer was still
exposed to counterparty credit and replacement risk, its balance sheet
was also likely to be more diversified and enjoy access to more
sources of Pound Sterling and Yen liquidity. This enabled dealers to
better absorb counterparty credit, foreign exchange, and other risks,
and to bridge any temporal gaps between the financing needs of
Diana and the Japanese firm. As sophisticated financial institutions,
dealers were also likely to have specialist expertise in screening and
monitoring the creditworthiness of their counterparties and to be in a
better position to hedge any residual exposures. Perhaps most impor-
tantly, the status of dealers as repeat players in the marketplace theo-
retically imposed reputational constraints that made them less likely
to engage in opportunistic behavior. In Gilson and Kraakman's terms,
this enabled dealers to function as reputational intermediaries: renting
their reputations to their clients as a means of lowering information,
agency, and other costs and strengthening the credibility of the com-
mitments underpinning parallel loans. In effect, the reputation of
dealers acted as a substitute for investments in information about the
creditworthiness of potential counterparties.
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While the Bretton Woods system was incrementally dismantled
during the 1970s,14 5 the financial innovation that it spawned would
eventually evolve to become what we now know as foreign exchange
or currency swaps. 146 And like their forebears, modern derivatives
markets continue to rely on dealers as the primary source of market
information, access, and liquidity. The central position of dealers
within the structure of derivatives markets puts them in an advanta-
geous position to acquire and aggregate private information about the
creditworthiness of their clients, historical prices, prevailing market
conditions, and other trading information. In effect, dealers acquire
and aggregate this information as a natural byproduct of their interac-
tions with clients and other dealers as part of the market-making
process. Viewed from this perspective, dealers thus represent a new
and distinct form of market mechanism: structurally-informed traders.
145 See Peter M. Garber, The Collapse of the Bretton Woods Fixed Exchange Rate
System, in A RETROSPECTIVE ON THE BRETTON WOODS SYsTEM: LESSONS FOR
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY REFORM 461 (Michael D. Bordo & Barry Eichengreen eds.,
1993).
146 Once the Bretton Woods capital controls were removed, parallel loans were no
longer required in order to inject capital into foreign subsidiaries. At the same time, the
dismantling of the Bretton Woods pegged exchange rate regime meant that many
currencies now floated against one another on the basis of market forces. Accordingly,
firms needed to manage the foreign exchange risk associated with their foreign operations.
By eliminating the requirement to make the actual loan-which had always been costly for
dealers because they had to keep it on their books-and focusing instead on exchanging
cash flows on the basis of fluctuations in the exchange rate between two currencies,
parallel loans thus evolved into the first currency swaps. See MEHRLING, supra note 139, at
72-75 (describing how parallel loans were used to circumvent national controls).
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Whereas Gilson and Kraakman's professionally informed traders are
incentivized to actively ferret out and trade on new information, struc-
turally informed traders passively acquire this information as a natural
byproduct of their market-making activities.147
Theoretically, the position of dealers as structurally-informed
traders should enable them to extract informational rents from their
clients. These rents would likely be embedded in the bid-ask spreads
quoted by dealers on different derivatives. The information obtained
by dealers as part of their derivatives market-making activities may
also be of value to them in other areas-e.g., equity and debt under-
writing, fixed income market making, and, where permitted, proprie-
tary trading.1 48 Importantly, this gives dealers powerful incentives to
protect the economic value of the information obtained through their
privileged market position. In the absence of clear and enforceable
intellectual property rights, the most straightforward way to protect
the value of this information is to ensure that it is not widely
disseminated.
This presents us with something of a puzzle. How does informa-
tion that is initially distributed to such a narrow group of traders-all
of whom possess powerful incentives not to share it-become
reflected in derivatives prices? The first part of the answer is that in
order to profit from this private information, dealers need to trade on
it. As we have seen, traders within derivatives markets will invariably
know both the identity of their counterparties and the direction of
their exposure to the underlying (at least with respect to that specific
trade). Moreover, as described above, a significant volume of deriva-
tives trading takes place between dealers. Thus, for example, JP
Morgan will know when it enters into a five-year total return equity
swap on Apple shares that its counterparty is Goldman Sachs. It will
also likely know that Goldman Sachs was the co-lead underwriter on
Apple's $17 billion sale of floating rate notes in April 2013,149 and
accordingly, that it may possess private information about the firm's
creditworthiness and future prospects. The fact that Goldman Sachs
takes a long or short position in shares of Apple under the swap thus
potentially serves to signal valuable private information to JP
147 At the same time, of course, dealers may also continue to actively seek out and trade
on new information, thus simultaneously performing the role of professionally informed
traders.
148 See infra section V.A for a very brief discussion of recent restrictions that impact on
the ability of some dealers to engage in proprietary trading.
149 Apple Inc., Preliminary Prospectus Supplement (Form 424B2) (Apr. 29,2013), http://
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/320193/000119312515028777/d861669d424b2.htm#toc.
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Morgan. 50 Such signalling may help explain Acharya and Johnson's
findings that the pattern of information revelation within CDS mar-
kets is consistent with trading by insider banks on the basis of private
information. 51
It is worth briefly considering what types of private information
can be effectively signaled in this way. Intuitively, the strength of the
signal will be a function of the recipient's ability to correctly identify
which traders are likely to be in possession of private information. It
will also be a function of whether the information itself is "hard"
financial or strategic information, or "soft" forecasts or other forward-
looking information. Trading by relationship banks, for example, is
likely to send a relatively strong signal about the creditworthiness of
corporate debt issuers, both because of the certainty surrounding the
bank's insider status, and because their assessments are likely to be
based on hard financial information. It is thus not surprising that the
available empirical evidence suggests that CDS markets rapidly incor-
porate negative credit information into prices. 5 2
However, in many other contexts, it may be far more difficult to
determine whether a trader possesses private information. The infor-
mation a trader possesses may also consist of soft information such as
forecasts, and thus be inherently subject to disagreement and diver-
gent interpretations. It seems highly unlikely, for example, that a
trader would possess hard private information about future move-
ments in foreign exchange or interest rates. 53 Moreover, even if the
trader did, it is unlikely that other traders would know that the trader
was in possession of this information such that they would be able to
identify the insider's trades as signalling private information.1 5 4
Ceteris paribus, it would thus seem far less likely that signalling of this
variety would play an important role in the incorporation of new
150 The value of this signal is of course reduced insofar as Goldman Sachs may simply be
engaged in market-making for one of its clients.
151 See generally Acharya & Johnson, supra note 134.
152 See Acharya & Johnson, supra note 134 and accompanying text; Blanco et al., supra'
note 136 and accompanying text; Hull et al., supra note 137 and accompanying text;
Norden & Weber, Information Efficiency, supra note 135 and accompanying text.
153 At least in the absence of market manipulation with respect to the setting of these
rates as occurred in the case of the London Interbank Offered Rate (Libor). See HER
MAJESTY's TREASURY, THE WHEATLEY REVIEW OF LIBOR: FiNAL REPORT (2012), https://
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment data/file/191762/wheatley
review .liborfinalreport_280912.pdf (detailing market manipulation by several panel
banks in connection with the setting of the widely used benchmark interest rate).
154 The notable exception in this regard being central banks, which may be both active
participants in interest rate or currency swap markets and possess inside information about
impending policy decisions likely to have an impact on the price of the relevant underlying.
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information into prices within these markets.155 Accordingly, insofar
as existing empirical evidence is largely confined to studies of the CDS
market, we must be careful not to overstate claims regarding the
informational efficiency of derivatives markets as a whole.
Theoretically, then, trade decoding can help disseminate informa-
tion within dealer-intermediated derivatives markets. At the same
time, the idea that dealers may signal private information through
their trading activities raises a host of other important questions. In
the absence of an exchange, how can dealers observe the trading
activities of other dealers? How can they distinguish between trades
designed to offset exposures taken on behalf of clients from those
designed to make a directional bet on the basis of private informa-
tion? And how do they overcome the signalling problems generated
by the economic and legal heterogeneity of derivatives contracts? For
answers to these questions, we must look to other mechanisms of
derivatives market efficiency.
B. Interdealer Brokers and Electronic Trading Platforms
As described above, dealers play an important role in the inter-
mediation of derivatives markets. As part of this role, dealers often
seek to hedge client exposures by entering into offsetting trades. 156
Where permitted, dealers may also engage in proprietary derivatives
trading.15 7 Many of these trades will be entered into with other
dealers. Interdealer brokers are intermediaries who enable dealers to
exchange information with other dealers regarding their desire to buy
or sell derivatives and other financial instruments. The largest
interdealer brokers are NEX Group (formerly ICAP), Tullett Prebon,
Tradition, BCG Partners, and GFI Group.158 As their name suggests,
the services of interdealer brokers are generally available only to
dealers. Institutional investors and other "buy-side" traders do not
typically enjoy access to interdealer brokers' full range of services.159
155 Equity derivatives, such as total return swaps, present an interesting case study. On
the one hand, it is possible for traders to possess hard private information about the issuer
of a public equity security. On the other hand, in the absence of an unambiguous signal
analogous to that of the relationship of banks, examined by Johnson and Acharya, it may
be difficult for traders to successfully identify whether another trader is acting on the basis
of private information.
156 Darrell Duffie, The Failure Mechanics of Dealer Banks, 24 J. ECON. PERSP. 51, 56
(2010).
157 Id.
158 Interdealer Brokers: At the Sharp End, EcoNoMIsT (Nov. 17, 2012), http://www
.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21566651-firms-connect-buyers-and-sellers-
wholesale-markets-are-under.
159 Although the move of asset managers, such as BlackRock, into derivatives market
making is beginning to disrupt this status quo.
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Interdealer brokers will, however, often make some anonymized com-
posite data, such as the average quoted bid-ask spread on various
derivatives, available to the broader marketplace. 160 More granular
composite data is available for a fee through market data providers
such as Bloomberg and Reuters.
Historically, interdealer brokers have conducted the majority of
their business over the telephone. Pursuant to this "voice brokerage"
model, individual brokers are responsible for trading a specific instru-
ment and have a direct line with the relevant traders at one or more of
the firm's clients. As trade requests are received, these brokers then
confer with their colleagues with the objective of identifying another
of the firm's clients willing to take the opposite side of the trade.
ECNs, meanwhile, enable dealers to communicate with other dealers
via dedicated web-based trading portals. Major ECNs include Instinet
and NYSE Arca. Once they have identified a potential counterparty,
ECNs then enable dealers to execute the trade electronically or
engage in further negotiations over the telephone. Some electronic
trading platforms also facilitate trading between dealers and their cli-
ents. These dealer-to-client platforms enable clients to access quoted
bid-ask spreads and other information from either a single dealer or
multiple dealers. These quotes will often include different price bands
depending upon the client's profile and previous trading history with
the specific dealer. Major multiple dealer-to-client platforms include
those offered by TradeWeb and Bloomberg.
Interdealer brokers and ECNs play a number of roles in sup-
porting derivatives market efficiency. First, interdealer brokers and
ECNs perform a function for dealers broadly analogous to the one
that dealers perform for their clients: aggregating information about
supply and demand, matching buyers and sellers, and thus lowering
search costs within derivatives markets. Second, multiple dealer-to-
client ECNs enable clients to compare quotes from different dealers,
thereby enhancing competition and ameliorating potential adverse
selection and agency problems. Third, by aggregating and dissemi-
nating composite market data, interdealer brokers provide dealers
and clients with valuable information about prevailing market condi-
tions. Importantly, this composite data can serve as a benchmark
160 The production of this composite data often involves significant interpolation. In
many cases, it also does not include information about the size/notional amount of the
relevant trades. MARCO AVELLANEDA & RAMA CONT, INT'L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES
AsS'N, TRANSPARENCY IN OVER-THE-COUNTER INTEREST RATE DERIVATIVES MARKETS
11 (2010), http://www.isda.org/c-and-a/pdf/IRMarketTransparency.pdf. The informational
content of this data is thus open to debate. See RATES TRANSPARENCY STUDY,
MARKITWIRE (July 2010).
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against which traders can determine whether another trader may be in
possession of superior information. Returning to our previous
example, if Goldman Sachs is quoting a price that deviates signifi-
cantly from the reported average for total return swaps on shares of
Apple Inc., this may signal to JP Morgan that its counterparty is
trading on the basis of private information. 161 Finally, while
interdealer brokers typically offer dealers full pre-trade anonymity,
they may nevertheless serve as informal conduits for the transmission
of market intelligence regarding, for example, whether a dealer has a
large open position in a given derivative or other security.162
C. Netting and Collateral Regimes
As we have seen, idiosyncratic counterparty credit risk is a poten-
tially significant source of economic and legal heterogeneity within
derivatives markets. 63 This heterogeneity may or may not be
reflected in the stated price of a derivatives trade, thereby rendering
efficiency-enhancing trade and price decoding more costly.
Counterparties use two primary mechanisms to mitigate counterparty
credit risk.164 The first is closeout netting. Closeout netting involves
the termination, valuation, and netting out of contractual obligations
in the event of counterparty default or insolvency.s65 Where the
netted closeout amount puts the non-defaulting counterparty in the
money, closeout netting entitles this party to immediately seize (as
necessary)1 66 and liquidate any collateral posted by the defaulting
counterparty in satisfaction of this amount.1 67 Where the defaulting
counterparty is in the money, in contrast, closeout netting entitles the
non-defaulting party to set off against the amount it owes to the
defaulting counterparty any amounts owed to it by the defaulting
counterparty 68 This set off is available irrespective of whether the
161 Of course, the strength of this signal will be a function of how closely the reported
average tracks the actuallprice of executed trades.
162 To prevent this, dealers may break up their trades amongst multiple interdealer
brokers and counterparties.
163 See discussion supra Part III.A.
164 See JoiiN ARMOUR ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL REGULATION (forthcoming
2016) (manuscript at 469-70).
165 Id.
166 In what is ultimately an excellent example of the legal heterogeneity associated with
derivatives contracts, the precise operation of closeout netting will depend on whether the
relevant collateral was posted pursuant to a title transfer or security interest system. Under
a title transfer system, there is technically no need for the non-defaulting counterparty to
"seize" the relevant collateral upon default.
167 With any residual amounts owed generally being treated as an unsecured claim in the
defaulting counterparty's estate.
168 See JOHN ARMOUR ET AL., supra note 164 (manuscript at 469-70).
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amounts owed to the non-defaulting counterparty are derived from
derivatives trades or other obligations. Importantly, the enforceability
of closeout netting relies on a series of carve outs-or "safe
harbors"-from the automatic stay and fraudulent preference rules
under applicable insolvency laws. 169
The second mechanism used to minimize counterparty credit risk
is collateral. Dealers and other counterparties generally seek to mini-
mize their residual net exposures after closeout netting by requiring
their counterparties to post collateral-typically cash or highly liquid
securities-at the outset of trade. This collateral, often referred to as
"initial margin" or the "independent amount," is theoretically
designed to reflect each counterparty's exposure to the default of the
other counterparty over the duration of the trade.170 Thereafter,
counterparties may also periodically recalculate the amount of collat-
eral one or both counterparties are required to post. This "variation
margin" is designed to reflect changes in the market price of the rele-
vant underlying security. Changes in variation margin may take place
in accordance with predetermined contractual triggers-e.g., adverse
price movements or a downgrade in a counterparty's credit rating-or
be negotiated on a more ad hoc basis in response to market develop-
ments. Like closeout netting, the enforceability of these collateral
arrangements relies on safe harbors from applicable insolvency
laws.171
Together, closeout netting and collateral can theoretically trans-
form a trader's exposure to idiosyncratic counterparty credit risk into
an exposure to the market risk of the underlying collateral. In order
for this transformation to take place, a derivatives trade must meet
four conditions. These conditions can be thought of as constituting a
first-best state contingent contract. 72 First, the value of posted collat-
169 For further information about these safe harbors under U.S. insolvency law, see
Franklin R. Edwards & Edward R. Morrison, Derivatives and the Bankruptcy Code: Why
the Special Treatment?, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 91 (2005) (examining different rationales for
the introduction and expansion of the derivatives safe harbors); Frank Partnoy & David A.
Skeel, Jr., The Promise and Perils of Credit Derivatives, 75 U. CIN. L. REv. 1019 (2007)
(examining the impact of credit derivatives on firm governance); Mark J. Roe, The
Derivatives Market's Payment Priorities as Financial Crisis Accelerator, 63 STAN. L. REV.
539 (2011) (examining how the derivatives safe harbors shift risk between a firm's
creditors, changing the incentives of creditors to monitor firm-level risk-taking, and
potentially contributing to systemic risk). For further information about the equivalent
carve outs in the UK and EU, see ALASTAIR HUDSON, THE LAW ON FINANCIAL
DERIVATIVEs 767-94 (5th ed. 2012) (describing the UK equivalent of the derivatives safe
harbors).
170 See ARMOUR ET AL., supra note 164 (manuscript at 469).
171 Id.
172 In a nutshell, a "first-best" contract can be understood as the one that the parties to a
contract would enter into in the absence of cognitive or temporal constraints, imperfect
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eral must in all potential future states of the world at least equal the
amount owed to the non-defaulting counterparty after the application
of closeout netting. Second, the non-defaulting counterparty must be
able to seize this collateral costlessly. Third, the collateral itself must
be sufficiently liquid such that the non-defaulting counterparty can
rapidly sell it at or near full market value.1 73 This points us in the
direction of the optimal forms of collateral: highly liquid and informa-
tionally insensitive debt such as cash, U.S. treasury securities, and
other highly rated sovereign debt.1 74 The desirability of these forms of
financial collateral is reflected in the results of ISDA's 2015 margin
survey, in which respondents reported that 76.6% of collateral
received and 77.7% of collateral delivered in connection with bilater-
ally cleared derivatives trades was in the form of cash. 75 Finally,
although technically not related to closeout netting and collateral
arrangements, the non-defaulting counterparty must secure a credible
commitment from a third party to fully insure it against any replace-
ment risk in the event of counterparty default.
Importantly, where these conditions are satisfied, this first-best
state contingent contract will put non-defaulting traders in the exact
same position they would have been had their counterparty not
defaulted. Put differently, this contract renders traders economically
indifferent to the creditworthiness of their counterparties, thus elimi-
nating the need for costly counterparty screening and monitoring.
Viewed from this perspective, mechanisms such as closeout netting
and collateral serve as substitutes for investments in information.
Insofar as these mechanisms ensure that counterparties possess sym-
metric information regarding the consequences of default, they also
ameliorate potential adverse selection problems. 76 Most importantly
information, or other transaction costs. This can be contrasted with a "second-best"
contract, which is the best contract the parties are able to write once these costs are taken
into account.
173 Or sufficiently over-collateralized that the proceeds of sale, even at a discount, are
sufficient to satisfy the first condition.
174 See Gary Gorton & Guillermo Ordofiez, Collateral Crises, 104 Am. ECON. REv. 343
(2014) (describing informationally insensitive assets and describing their role in
contributing to financial instability); Holmstrom, supra note 108, at 3 (describing the
economic function of collateral as a substitute for information in the context of money
markets); Tri Vi Dang et al., Ignorance, Debt and Financial Crises 1 (March 2013)
(unpublished manuscript) (discussing how debt, when used as collateral for another debt
contract, preserves symmetric ignorance because it minimizes the incentive to produce
private information about the payoffs, so debt is least information-sensitive), http://
www.columbia.edu/-td2332/Paper-Ignorance.pdf.
175 INT'L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES Ass'N, ISDA MARGIN SURVEY 2015, at 8 (2015),
https://www2.isda.org/functional-areas/research/surveys/margin-surveys/.
176 See Holmstrom, supra note 108, at 5 (describing the economic function of collateral
as a substitute for information in the context of money markets).
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for the present purposes, by eliminating the noise generated by the
dark side of derivative contracts, these mechanisms can be understood
as enhancing the clarity of the signal sent by stated derivatives prices.
This, in turn, can be seen as creating a more conducive environment
for efficiency enhancing trade and price decoding.
Ultimately, of course, first-best state contingent contracts of the
variety described above may be extremely costly. As a preliminary
matter, there is little consensus surrounding the methodologies for
calculating initial and variation margin requirements for OTC deriva-
tives. At the same time, high quality liquid collateral is increasingly
expensive. Counterparties may also incur non-trivial costs in seizing
and liquidating it, especially where collateral is located in different
jurisdictions and/or subject to different property law or regulatory
regimes. Perhaps most importantly, the cost of obtaining credible ex
ante insurance against replacement risk from private market partici-
pants is likely to be prohibitive given the prospect of highly correlated
payouts in the context of widespread market disruption.1 77 As a result,
derivatives counterparties may understandably resort to second-best
contracts that expose them to some level of risk in the event of
counterparty default.
Importantly, where any of these conditions is not satisfied, the
economic heterogeneity stemming from idiosyncratic counterparty
credit risk and other factors178 may continue to generate price distor-
tions that undermine efficiency-enhancing trade and price decoding.
At present, there is insufficient publicly available information about
closeout netting and collateral practices within global derivatives mar-
kets to determine whether or to what extent these conditions are satis-
fied. 179 Ultimately, these practices can vary across any number of
dimensions: from the amount of pledged collateral, its quality, and
whether it can be reused or rehypothecated, to the timing of variation
margin calculations, and the circumstances-or triggers-that will
require counterparties to post additional margin. As a result, there
exists considerable scope for significant levels of economic heteroge-
neity within derivatives markets. Where this heterogeneity exists, the
177 The role of central banks in this context as "dealers of last resort" is explored in
Section V.E.
178 See discussion supra Part III.A.
179 The type of information that would be required in this regard is discussed in Section
V.B and Appendix. For an encouraging recent development in this area, see EUROPEAN
CENT. BANK, SURVEY ON CREDIT TERMS AND CONDITIONS IN EURO-DENOMINATED
SECURITIES FINANCING AND OTC DERIVATIVES MARKETS (2016), http://www.ecb.
europa.eu/press/pr/date/2016/html/SESFOD-report_2ol6ql.pdf?23a49681fd80aa2bea8f815
623024a72 (reporting on the European Central Bank's first efforts to study credit terms
and conditions in Euro-denominated securities financing and OTC derivatives markets).
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dark side of derivatives markets will cast a shadow over the informa-
tional efficiency of derivatives prices.
D. ISDA and Contractual Standardization
This leaves legal heterogeneity as a potential obstacle to deriva-
tives market efficiency. It is at this point that we encounter the impor-
tant role of ISDA in the development of modern derivatives markets.
Established in 1985, ISDA is the de facto trade association of the
global derivatives industry, representing some 850 member dealers,
institutional investors, governments, and other major counterpar-
ties.180 ISDA's core mandate is to encourage the prudent and efficient
development of derivatives markets through the promotion of, inter
alia, practices conducive to the efficient conduct of business, sound
risk management practices, and high standards of commercial con-
duct. 1" While ISDA's contribution toward the development of global
derivatives markets can be observed across several dimensions,1 82 two
in particular stand out as promoting greater informational efficiency.
First, ISDA has spearheaded the development of specialized legal
documentation for use in derivatives trades. Prior to the intervention
of ISDA, the majority of derivatives were documented in ad hoc
agreements negotiated on a trade-by-trade basis. 83 The costs of
designing, drafting, and negotiating these agreements understandably
represented a significant barrier to the growth of derivatives mar-
kets.184 Stepping into this breach, ISDA commenced publication of its
Code of Standard Wording, Assumptions, and Provisions for Swaps in
1985.185 The ISDA Swaps Code was essentially a glossary of standard
terms reflecting then existing practice within the U.S. interest rate
swap market.18 6 In 1987, ISDA published its first standardized
"master" agreements for U.S. dollar and multicurrency interest rate
swaps and currency swaps.' 87 These master agreements incorporated
180 About ISDA, INT'L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES Ass'N, www2.isda.orglabout-ISDAl (last
visited Sept. 2, 2016).
181 Id.
182 For a more comprehensive discussion of the ISDA's contributions to the
development of the global derivatives markets, see Awrey, supra note 116, at 200-23.
183 Norman Menachem Feder, Deconstructing Over-the-Counter Derivatives, 17 COLUM.
Bus. L. REV. 677, 736 (2002) (discussing the development of derivatives markets
generally).
184 See id. at 738 (discussing the critical role that standardization of contractual terms
played in the development of derivatives markets).
185 INT'L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS'N, CODE OF STANDARD WORDING, AssuMTIONS
AND PROVISIONS FOR SWAPS (1985).
186 Feder, supra note 183, at 737.
187 See, e.g., INT'L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES Ass'N, 1987 INTEREST RATE AND CURRENCY
EXCHANGE DEFINITIONS (1987), http://www.isda.org/publications/pdf(1987currdefs.pdf.
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multiple future transactions between two counterparties under the
umbrella of a single legal relationship, contemplating only the prepa-
ration of a brief confirmation for individual trades. Over time, the
scope of these master agreements has been expanded to include
equity, commodity, credit, and other derivatives.188 ISDA has also
developed a series of protocols that facilitate the ex post amendment
of existing master agreements with a view towards, inter alia,
responding to jurisprudential developments, implementing new
advancements, rectifying perceived technical deficiencies, and, more
generally, standardizing market practice.1 89 Together, master agree-
ments and protocols serve to reduce the design, drafting, negotiation,
and other transaction costs that would otherwise be incurred by
counterparties in connection with the preparation of legal documenta-
tion for individual trades.
Second, ISDA has taken the lead in promoting international law
reform in areas critical to the development of derivatives markets.
Perhaps most significantly, ISDA has produced a Model Netting Act
and supplemental guidance for legislators in order to assist them in
enacting legislation designed to ensure the enforceability of closeout
netting and collateral arrangements.1 90 As of July 26, 2011, netting leg-
islation based on this guidance has been adopted in at least 40 jurisdic-
tions, including the United States, EU, Japan, and Canada.191 More
broadly, ISDA has played an active role in influencing public policy
and financial law reform-including the design and implementation of
post-crisis reforms targeting derivatives markets, such as Title VII of
the Dodd-Frank Act and the European Market Infrastructure
Regulation (EMIR).1 92 Whether or not one views the Model Netting
Act and other reforms as desirable from a broader social perspective,
188 ISDA has also developed standardized ancillary documentation-including
definitions, schedules, credit support agreements, and trade confirmations-for use in
connection with these agreements.
189 See Traditional Adherence Protocols, INT'L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES Ass'N, www2.
isda.org/functional-areas/legal-and-documentation/protocols/ (last visited July 5, 2016)
(listing the protocols available from ISDA).
190 See generally INT'L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES Ass'N, MEMORANDUM ON THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF NETTING LEGISLATION 1 (2006); 2006 MODEL NETTING AcT (INT'L
SwAPS & DERIVATIVES Ass'N, 2007).
191 Netting Legislation-Status, INT'L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES Ass'N, http://isda.org/
docproj/stat-of-net_1eg.html (last visited Sept. 2, 2016).
192 See generally ISDA Focus: Dodd-Frank, INT'L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES Ass'N, https://
www2.isda.org/dodd-frank/ (last visited Sept. 2, 2016); ISDA Focus: European Legal and
Regulatory Implementation Initiatives, INT'L SWAPS & DERIVATIVEs Ass'N, http://
www2.isda.orglisda-focus-european-legal-and-regulatory-implementation-initiatives/ (last
visited Sept. 2, 2016).
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there is little doubt that they have contributed to the spectacular
growth of derivatives markets in recent decades. 193
Based on the two contributions described above, the benefits of
ISDA's activities can be understood as flowing largely from contrac-
tual standardization: both in terms of the contracts themselves and the
statutory frameworks that ensure their effective enforcement. Master
agreements standardize legal terms and terminology; protocols ensure
consistency between past and future contracts; and netting legislation
ensures equivalent treatment of closeout netting and financial collat-
eral arrangements across jurisdictions. This standardization makes
derivatives easier to write and understand. The standardization of
legal terms also makes it easier for counterparties-and dealers in
particular-to effectively hedge their derivatives exposures.
In order to understand why contractual standardization is so
important, imagine a dealer standing between two clients on opposite
sides of a trade (see Figure 4). Imagine also that the dealer and each
client were domiciled in, and subject to the laws of, different jurisdic-
tions. The dealer, as we have already seen, would theoretically prefer
to maintain a matched book and simply charge a fee for intermedi-
ating the trade and assuming the resulting counterparty credit and
other risks (which, of course, it may then also seek to shift by entering
into offsetting trades). However, complications would arise if the
courts in one jurisdiction (Jurisdiction A) issued an interpretation of a
material term of ISDA's master agreement that was inconsistent with
its interpretation in another jurisdiction (Jurisdiction C). Alterna-
tively, what if applicable insolvency laws in Jurisdiction A contained
safe harbors from the automatic stay and fraudulent preference provi-
sions-thereby enabling counterparties to closeout their positions and
seize collateral upon another counterparty's default-but Jurisdiction
C's insolvency legislation did not?
Counterparty Dealer < Counterparty
(Jurisdiction A) I (Jurisdiction B) (Jurisdiction C)
k k
Dealers can largely resolve the first problem by ensuring that the
contracts are both governed by the laws of a single jurisdiction, in
193 For a discussion of the potential moral hazard and other problems stemming from
the safe harbors for derivatives under U.S. bankruptcy law, see Edwards & Morrison,
supra note 169, at 121; Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 169, at 1033; Roe, supra note 169, at
555.
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practice, typically either the U.S. or UK.19 4 The second problem, how-
ever, is potentially more difficult to resolve. At the very least, this
legal heterogeneity would make it more complex-and thus more
costly-for dealers to manage the resulting economic differences
between the two sides of the trade (commonly known as "basis" risk).
In extremis, this basis risk might even undercut the incentives of
dealers to enter into derivatives with counterparties subject to the
insolvency laws of Jurisdiction C, thereby undercutting the economies
of scope associated with dealer intermediation.
With these potential problems in mind, contractual standardiza-
tion promoted by organizations such as ISDA can be understood as
making two important contributions to market efficiency. First, con-
tractual standardization reduces legal and economic heterogeneity,
thereby ameliorating a potentially significant source of efficiency-
inhibiting price distortions. Second, standardization reduces the infor-
mation, negotiation, hedging, and other costs of financial intermedia-
tion. Insofar as the reduction of these costs makes it more attractive
for dealers to make markets in derivatives, this standardization can
thus be seen as contributing to market liquidity-thereby improving
the process of price discovery, and promoting greater informational
efficiency within derivatives markets.1 95
The objective of this section has not been to suggest that deriva-
tives markets are relatively informationally efficient. This is ultimately
an empirical question that resides beyond the scope of this paper.
Moreover, it seems intuitively likely that different derivatives markets
will incorporate new information into prices at different speeds and in
different ways. What this section has instead attempted to do is
examine some of the existing institutional arrangements that might
serve to promote greater informational efficiency within derivatives
markets and, importantly, how they theoretically respond to the infor-
mation and other problems stemming from the nature of derivatives
contracts, the structure of the markets in which they trade, and the
sources of market liquidity. In the process, this section has also
examined some of the costs associated with these arrangements, and
thus their practical limits as mechanisms of derivatives market effi-
194 As of April 2010, it is estimated that these two jurisdictions accounted for
approximately 70% of global turnover in interest rate derivatives, and 55% of the global
turnover in foreign exchange derivatives. BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, TRIENNIAL
CENTRAL BANK SURVEY: FOREIGN EXCHANGE AND DERIVATIVES MARKET AcrivrrY IN
APRIL 2010, at 5-6 (2010). Unfortunately, the triennial survey in 2013 did not provide an
update of these estimates.
195 These non-dealer counterparties may also benefit from a reduction in legal and other
forms of basis risk insofar as they, too, are entering into multiple (potentially offsetting)
swaps with multiple counterparties.
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
November 2016] 1155
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
ciency. The next section examines some of the important policy impli-
cations that flow from this analysis.
V
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
This examination of the mechanisms of derivatives markets effi-
ciency raises a host of important and timely policy questions. 96 The
most important of these questions revolve around the potential impact
of recent regulatory reforms introduced in the wake of the 2008 finan-
cial crisis. These reforms include the introduction of new derivatives
trade reporting and disclosure requirements, a greater emphasis on
macroprudential surveillance of derivatives markets, the shift toward
mandatory central clearing for many standardized derivatives, and the
imposition of new and more onerous prudential requirements on
derivatives dealers under Basel III.197 This examination also raises
important questions about the optimal balance between public and
private ordering within derivatives markets. This section examines
each of these policy questions in greater detail.
A. Derivatives Trade Reporting and Disclosure
Promoting greater market efficiency is frequently identified as
one of the fundamental objectives of securities regulation.1 98 In pur-
suit of this objective, securities laws typically impose pre-trade trans-
parency requirements on stock exchanges and other trading platforms
to publicly disseminate prevailing bid, ask, volume, and other market
information. 99 They also require post-trade dissemination of price,
196 Yesha Yadav has already examined one of these policy questions: namely, whether
we need to rethink our approach toward the regulation of insider trading within
derivatives-and in particular CDS-markets. See Yesha Yadav, Insider Trading in
Derivatives Markets, 103 GEo. L.J. 381 (2015).
197 See infra Part V for a more detailed exploration of these policy questions.
198 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory
Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REv. 717 (1984) (examining the case for mandatory
disclosure regimes as a mechanism for promoting market efficiency); Zohar Goshen &
Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711
(2006) (arguing that the essential role of securities regulation is to create a market for
professionally informed traders).
199 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78a-78pp (2012)); Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496 (June 29,
2005) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 201, 230, 240, 242, 249 & 270) (establishing new rules
for the dissemination of market information). Alternative trading platforms are a notable
exception, where regulatory rules contemplate the non-application or waiver of pre-trade
transparency requirements in certain circumstances. See, e.g., Regulation of Alternative
Trading Systems, 64 Fed. Reg. 19,450 (Apr. 21, 1999) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 202, 240,
242 & 249).
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volume, and other information in connection with executed trades.200
Historically, derivatives have been largely exempt from, the applica-
tion of these pre- and post-trade transparency requirements. 201 In
response to the recent financial crisis, however, policymakers in the
U.S. and elsewhere have introduced a number of regulatory reforms
designed to enhance the transparency of derivatives markets.
Section 727 of the Dodd-Frank Act, for example, mandates post-
trade reporting of price, volume, and other information for all swaps
to a registered swaps data repository (SDR).202 The information that
must be reported to an SDR under section 727 includes the notional
value of the swap; the stated price or exchange rate; whether any
counterparty to the swap is a dealer, major swap participant (MSP), or
financial entity; whether the swap is collateralized; the date and time it
was executed; and its maturity, termination, or end date.203 This infor-
mation must be reported by a designated counterparty at the time the
swap is executed.204 The designated counterparty must also report any
changes to the primary economic terms of the swap over the life of the
contract.205
Section 727 of the Dodd-Frank Act also imposes an affirmative
obligation on SDRs to ensure the real-time public dissemination of
certain anonymized information in relation to executed trades. 206 This
obligation applies to all swaps subject to SDR reporting requirements
(other than certain foreign exchange derivatives) 207 that are executed
as part of an "arm's-length transaction between two parties that
200 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, supra note 199; see also Regulation NMS, supra
note 199.
201 See WILLIAM C. MEEHAN & GABRIEL D. ROSENBERG, OTC DERIVATIVES
REGULATION UNDER DODD-FRANK: A GUIDE To REGISTRATION, REPORTING, BUSINESS
CONDUCT, AND CLEARING 70-71 (2014) (describing the pre-Dodd-Frank Act regulation of
OTC derivatives markets).
202 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 727, 124 Stat. 1376, 1696 (2010). The basic requirement articulated in section 727 is then
supplemented by regulatory rules prescribing in greater detail what information is to be
reported. Swap Data Recordkeeping and Reporting Requirements, 17 C.F.R. pt. 45 (2012)
[hereinafter SDR Reporting Rule].
203 SDR Reporting Rule, supra note 202, app. 1.
204 SDR Reporting Rule § 45.8 provides a hierarchy for the purposes of determining
which counterparty is required to report the relevant information. SDR Reporting Rule,
supra note 202, § 45.8; see also MEEHAN & ROSENBERG, supra note 201, at 72-75.
205 MEEHAN & ROSENBERG, supra note 201, at 75-76.
206 Once again, this basic requirement is then supplemented by more detailed rules
prescribing what information SDRs are required to disseminate. Real-Time Public
Reporting of Swap Transaction Data, 17 C.F.R. pt. 43 (2012) [hereinafter Real-Time
Reporting Rule].
207 And specifically those subject to the Treasury Amendment. Determination of
Foreign Exchange Swaps and Foreign Exchange Forwards Under the Commodity
Exchange Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 69,694 (Nov. 20, 2012).
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results in a corresponding change in the market risk position between
the two parties." 208 This obligation is coupled with a negative obliga-
tion not to disseminate information "in a manner that discloses or oth-
erwise facilitates the identification of a party to a swap." 209 There is
also an exception for information relating to block trades and other
large transactions, the dissemination of which may be subject to a
brief delay.210 The information that must be publicly disseminated by
SDRs includes the notional value of the swap; the stated price or
exchange rate; the underlying assets; whether the swap is bilaterally or
centrally cleared; and whether it is collateralized, along with its settle-
ment currency, payment and reset frequency, and effective start and
end dates.211 In order to ensure the uniform distribution of this infor-
mation within the marketplace, dealers and MSPs are prohibited from
disclosing swap transaction and pricing data prior to its dissemination
by the relevant SDR.212 Simultaneously, however, dealers and MSPs
are permitted to disclose this information to their clients at the same
time as they report it to the SDR, provided that the counterparties to
these trades are notified in advance and that the disclosure is nondis-
criminatory.213 Where this disclosure takes place, these clients will
thus receive potentially valuable information before it is available to
the wider marketplace.
In addition to this extensive post-trade reporting and disclosure,
the Dodd-Frank Act also introduces a limited degree of pre-trade
transparency. Section 723 requires that derivatives subject to
mandatory central clearing214 be executed on either a "designated
contract market" (DCM) or "swap execution facility" (SEF). 2 1 5
DCMs are essentially options and futures exchanges that, technically
at least, also facilitate trading in swaps.216 DCMs thus typically route
submitted bids and asks into a transparent central order book and
208 Real-Time Reporting Rule, supra note 206, § 43.2.
209 Id. § 43.4(d)(1).
210 See MEEHAN & ROSENBERG, supra note 201, at 102-04 (describing the types of
trades that are subject to delays and the prescribed length of the delay).
211 Real-Time Reporting Rule, supra note 206, app. A.
212 Id. § 43.3(b)(3)(ii).
213 Id. § 43.3(b)(3)(ii)(A)-(D).
214 See infra Section V.C (discussing the evolution of derivatives regulation with the
introduction of mandatory central clearing).
215 Unless the swap is not available to trade. In order to be available to trade, a swap
must either be listed for trading on a DCM or SEF or have been submitted to the CFTC
for review as potentially subject to the mandatory clearing requirement. Process for a
Designated Contract Market or Swap Execution Facility to Make a Swap Available to
Trade, Swap Transaction Compliance and Implementation Schedule, and Trade Execution
Requirement Under the Commodity Exchange Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 33,606 (June 4, 2013)
(codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 37.10, 38.12).
216 In practice, DCMs have rarely been used to facilitate trading in swaps.
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then, much like conventional stock exchanges, use order-matching
and trade-pricing rules to match buyers and sellers. SEFs, in contrast,
are trading platforms designed solely to facilitate trading in swaps. In
addition to routing trades through a central order book, SEFs may
also operate on the basis of a "request-for-quote" (RFQ) system. The
Commodity Futures Trading Commission describes a RFQ system as
"a trading system or platform in which a market participant transmits
a request for a quote to buy or sell a specific instrument to no less
than three market participants in the trading system or platform, to
which all such market participants may respond." 217 An SEF that
offers an RFQ system for any swap subject to mandatory central
clearing is required to inform a trader requesting a quote of any firm
bids or asks currently in its order book for the same contract.218 SEFs
are also prohibited from using any mechanism that prevents a trader
from viewing the bids or asks communicated by other traders, or that
impedes the ability of a trader to interact or trade with any other
trader.219
The stated objective of the Dodd-Frank Act derivatives reporting
and disclosure requirements is to make swap transaction and pricing
data available to the public on a timely basis in order to enhance the
process of price discovery. 220 The trade execution requirements for
swaps subject to mandatory central clearing are similarly designed to
enhance price discovery and improve pre- and post-trade price trans-
parency. 221 On first inspection, it seems likely that these requirements
are likely to provide many derivatives traders with more information
about prevailing market conditions, along with price and other trans-
action data in connection with executed trades. 2 2 2 Amongst other ben-
efits, these requirements may serve to reduce search costs for traders
seeking multiple competitive quotes, thereby reducing the potentially
acute adverse selection and agency problems embedded within the
dealer-intermediated structure of derivatives markets.
217 Core Principles and Other Requirements for Swap Execution Facilities, 78 Fed. Reg.
33,476 (June 4, 2013) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 37).
218 Id.
219 Div. or CLEARING & RISK, Div. OF MKT. OVERSIGHT, AND Div. OF SWAP DEALER
AND INTERMEDIARY OVERSIGHT, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM'N,
GUIDANCE ON APPLICATION OF CERTAIN COMMISSION REGULATIONS TO SWAP
ExECUTION FACILITIES 1-3 (2013).
220 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 727, 124 Stat. 1376, 1696 (2010).
221 S. REP. No. 111-176, at 33-34 (2010).
222 Although, given the historic opacity of derivatives markets, it is admittedly difficult
to establish a benchmark against which to make this comparison.
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However, while the new derivatives trade reporting and disclo-
sure requirements will likely provide the marketplace and regulators
with more information, whether they will serve to promote greater
market efficiency is ultimately a different question. As a preliminary
matter, these requirements do little to shine a light on the economic
and legal heterogeneity that may reside just beneath the surface of the
information that market participants are required to report, and which
SDRs are required to publicly disseminate. Take collateral for
example. When disseminating trading information, SDRs are merely
required to provide an indication of whether a swap is collateral-
ized.2 2 3 The binary nature of this requirement disregards the fact
that-as we have already seen-derivatives collateral arrangements
can vary across a number of important dimensions, for example the
amount of pledged collateral, its quality, restrictions on reuse and
rehypothecation, and the timing and triggers of any variation margin
requirements. Each of these dimensions is relevant to the question of
how large each trader's exposure is to the idiosyncratic credit risk of
its counterparty. These requirements will thus not provide traders
with sufficiently granular information to isolate the impact of eco-
nomic and legal heterogeneity on the stated price of a derivatives con-
tract, thereby failing to remove a potentially significant barrier to
effective price discovery and informational efficiency.
Another potential barrier to greater market efficiency stems from
the fact that both the pre- and post-trade transparency requirements
introduced under the Dodd-Frank Act envision that disseminated
transaction data will be almost completely anonymized. This ano-
nymity can be understood as inhibiting market efficiency in at least
two ways. First, not knowing the identity of the counterparties to a
derivatives trade-for example whether a swap involves Apple Inc. or
Diana's Homemade Apple Pie Stand-makes it impossible for other
traders to isolate and measure the potential price distortions gener-
ated by idiosyncratic counterparty credit risk. Second, and along the
same vein, anonymity undermines the ability of traders to engage in
efficiency-enhancing trade decoding. While some degree of trade
decoding may still be possible as a result of the preferential treatment
afforded to the clients of dealers and MSPs, 2 2 4 it thus seems somewhat
unlikely that the anonymization of trading information under these
new transparency requirements will create a conducive environment
for derivatively informed trading.
223 Real-Time Reporting Rule, supra note 206, app. A.
224 Which will not only have advance access to trading information but, crucially, will
also know the identity of at least one of the counterparties.
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Perhaps counter-intuitively, the optimal policy response to the
lack of publicly available information about the identity of
counterparties and the precise terms of their contractual arrange-
ments-in short, the dark side of derivatives markets-may not be to
shine additional light on it. Indeed, as Kate Judge has observed, man-
dating further transparency in this context would actually serve to
increase information costs for traders,225 thereby undermining the
prospective benefits of mechanisms such as closeout netting and col-
lateral designed to serve as substitutes for investments in information
about the creditworthiness of derivatives counterparties. Once this
veil of mutual ignorance has been lifted, we might expect some
counterparties-namely dealers-to be in a better position to eval-
uate this new information. Recognizing this advantage, other traders
may be reluctant to enter into trades with these counterparties.
Viewed from this perspective, greater transparency may actually give
rise to an adverse selection problem, thereby undercutting market
liquidity and reducing the informational efficiency of derivatives
markets.
Finally, one might question whether the Dodd-Frank Act trade
reporting and disclosure requirements could potentially serve to
undercut the economic incentives of dealers to make markets in deriv-
atives. In examining this question, it may be useful to compare deriva-
tives markets with the dealer-intermediated markets for corporate,
government, and other bonds. Here, available empirical evidence gen-
erally suggests that the introduction of post-trade transparency
requirements is unlikely to have a significant impact on market
liquidity. For example, a 2007 empirical study conducted by Michael
Goldstein, Edith Hotchkiss, and Eric Sirri found that the introduction
of post-trade transparency requirements in connection with certain
U.S. corporate bond markets was correlated with narrower bid-ask
spreads and, crucially, did not result in lower trade volumes.226 Simul-
taneously, however, Hendrick Bessembinder and William Maxwell
have found that dealers held lower inventories of bonds and engaged
in less proprietary trading after the introduction of these require-
ments,227 suggesting that greater pre-trade transparency had diluted
some of the ancillary economic benefits of making markets.
Intuitively, we would expect the introduction of pre-trade trans-
parency requirements to have a more significant impact on derivatives
225 Judge, supra note 14, at 31-37.
226 Michael A. Goldstein et al., Transparency and Liquidity: A Controlled Experiment
on Corporate Bonds, 20 REV. FIN. STuD. 235, 237 (2007).
227 Hendrik Bessembinder & William Maxwell, Markets: Transparency and the
Corporate Bond Market, 22 J. ECON. PERSP. 217, 228, 231 (2008).
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market liquidity. This intuition stems from the fact that pre-trade
transparency requires dealers to disclose their quotes to the market-
place, thereby enabling other market participants to more easily com-
pare prices (thereby promoting greater competition) and potentially
signaling private information to the market (thereby reducing the
opportunity for dealers to profit from it). These requirements can thus
be understood as reducing the expected payoffs for dealers acting in
their capacity as structurally informed traders, and potentially incen-
tivizing them to cut back on their market-making activities. They can
similarly be understood as undercutting the incentives of profession-
ally informed traders to acquire, analyze, verify, and trade on new
information. Indeed, it seems highly likely that the anonymity require-
ments and block trade delays under the Dodd-Frank Act trade
reporting and disclosure rules have been introduced precisely to pro-
tect the economic incentives of dealers and professionally informed
traders. Paradoxically, then, greater transparency may result in
reduced liquidity, impede the process of price discovery, and con-
tribute to greater informational inefficiency within derivatives
markets.
B. Macroprudential Surveillance of Derivatives Markets
A second objective of the Dodd-Frank Act reporting and disclo-
sure requirements is to enhance the macroprudential surveillance of
derivatives markets by the newly created Financial Stability Oversight
Council and other members of the U.S. supervisory and regulatory
community. 228 One of the most important lessons of the financial
crisis was that the effective microprudential regulation and supervi-
sion of banks and other financial institutions must be combined with a
rigorous and comprehensive assessment of potential macroprudential
risks. 229 While the precise definition of macroprudential risk is still
228 See MEEHAN & ROSENBERG, supra note 201, at 71-72 (discussing how the SDR
reporting framework increases the regulatory burden for swap market participants).
229 See, e.g., Claudio Borio, Towards a Macroprudential Framework for Financial
Supervision and Regulation?, 49 CESIFo ECON. STUD. 181 (2003) (defining
microprudential and macroprudential regulation and arguing for a shift of emphasis
toward the latter); Samuel G. Hanson et al., A Macroprudential Approach to Financial
Regulation, 25 J. ECON. PERSP. 3 (2011) (articulating a detailed vision for how
macroprudential regulation and supervision might be designed); Robert Hockett, The
Macroprudential Turn: From Institutional 'Safety and Soundness' to 'Systemic Financial
Stability' in Financial Supervision, 9 VA. L. & Bus. REv. 201 (2015) (examining the legal
challenges to the effective implementation of macroprudential regulatory regimes);
Andrew Crockett, Gen. Manager, Bank for Int'l Settlements, Remarks Before the
Eleventh International Conference of Banking Supervisors (Sept. 18, 2000), http://www.
bis.org/review/r000922b.pdf (discussing the relationship between microprudential and
macroprudential stability).
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somewhat contested, it can be understood as encompassing at least
two different types of risks.230 The first are cross-sectional risks gener-
ated by various direct and indirect transmission mechanisms that
create complex and often hard to detect interconnections among and
between different financial markets and institutions. The second are
time series risks generated by the procyclicality of the financial cycle,
or arising by virtue of the interactions between financial and business
cycles.231
Derivatives pose a number of potentially significant
macroprudential risks. Perhaps most obviously, derivatives can gen-
erate cross-sectional risks as a result of direct counterparty exposures:
the financial distress or insolvency of one firm, operating within a par-
ticular jurisdiction or segment of the financial services industry, has
the potential to undermine the stability of its derivatives counterpar-
ties in other jurisdictions or market segments.232 The risks stemming
from this type of "domino" effect are arguably magnified by the
dealer-intermediated hub-and-spoke counterparty network at the
heart of derivatives markets. The collective actions of derivatives
traders can also generate indirect cross-sectional risks, such as those
arising from the correlated withdrawal of liquidity by dealers during
periods of market turmoil. Once again, given the highly concentrated
dealer-intermediated structure of derivatives markets and the wide-
spread use of derivatives across a broad range of (nonfinancial) sec-
tors, such correlated withdrawals can have reverberations far outside
the financial system.
Derivatives can also contribute to the procyclicality of the finan-
cial cycle. In order to understand how, we need to first understand
how derivatives can generate high levels of (implicit) leverage.233
Imagine that Diana, our market-savvy baker, enters into a total return
equity swap on shares of Apple Inc. with a notional value of US$10
million and semiannual payments of five percent. In effect, Diana has
contracted to pay her dealer US$500,000 every six months, in
exchange for which she will receive payments from the dealer equal to
any capital appreciation and dividends on US$10 million worth of
Apple shares. If the price of Apple Inc. declines, meanwhile, Diana
230 See ARMOUR ET AL., supra note 164 (manuscript at 410).
231 See Claudio Borio, The Financial Cycle and Macroeconomics: What Have We
Learnt?, 45 J. BANKING & FIN. 182 (2014) (examining the role of the financial cycle in
macroeconomics and macroprudential policy).
232 ARMOUR ET AL., supra note 164 (manuscript at 470-72).
233 See generally Jonathan R. Macey, Derivative Instruments: Lessons for the Regulatory
State, 21 J. CORP. L. 69, 82 (1995); Frank Partnoy, Financial Derivatives and the Costs of
Regulatory Arbitrage, 22 J. CORP. L. 211, 225-26 (1997).
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will be required to pay the dealer an amount equal to the value of this
decline. From a basic economic perspective, this swap is identical to
Diana simply borrowing US$10 million from the dealer on margin at a
rate of five percent interest and then investing the proceeds in Apple
shares. And like all debt financing, the implicit leverage associated
with derivatives means that relatively small changes in the market
price of the underlying can have a significant impact on the liquidity
and solvency of debtor counterparties.
That derivatives are essentially a form of debt instrument should
come as no surprise: What is idiosyncratic counterparty credit risk,
after all, if not the exposure of a lender to the default of a borrower?
Viewed in this light, many of the contractual terms underpinning a
derivatives trade become important determinants of the nature and
extent of this implicit leverage. Thus, for example, the quality and
amount of collateral that Diana (or the dealer) is required to post will,
in effect, determine the extent to which Diana's obligations to the
dealer (and vice versa) should be viewed as constituting secured debt.
Similarly, the precise conditions under which Diana will be required
to post additional collateral during the life of the contract will have
important implications in terms of the allocation of risk between
debtor and creditor counterparties. Where these collateral require-
ments, variation margin triggers, and other contractual terms are rela-
tively debtor friendly, this can ultimately be viewed as contributing to
the build-up of potentially socially suboptimal levels of indebtedness
within the financial system.
Against this backdrop, it is highly doubtful that the Dodd-Frank
Act derivatives reporting and disclosure requirements compel dealers
and other counterparties to report the type or granularity of informa-
tion needed to support effective macroprudential surveillance. 234 As
described above, the trade-level data required to be reported to an
SDR pursuant to section 727 includes: the notional value of a swap, its
price, whether one or both of the counterparties is a dealer, MSP, or
financial entity, and whether the swap is collateralized. 235 Notably,
however, these requirements do not require ongoing reporting of
gross market values or other measures of a counterparty's net expo-
sure over the life of a swap. Nor-beyond the mere fact of whether a
swap is or is not collateralized-do these requirements mandate
reporting of economically important terms such as the amount of
234 Although, once again, recent exercises such as the ECB's survey of credit conditions
in securities lending and derivatives markets are a step in the right direction. See
EUROPEAN CENT. BANK, supra note 179 (collecting information on trends in the credit
terms offered by firms in derivatives markets).
235 SDR Reporting Rule, supra note 202, app. 1.
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posted collateral, its composition and quality, or whether it can be
reused or rehypothecated in connection with other transactions. Per-
haps most importantly, these requirements do not compel detailed
reporting of the triggers pursuant to which counterparties may be
required to post additional variation margin. As a result, supervisors
may find themselves with insufficient data for the purposes of mea-
suring the level of leverage within derivatives markets, or identifying
circumstances where contractual terms may facilitate correlated run-
like behavior by derivatives and other counterparties as occurred in
advance of the failure of Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and AIG.23 6
To return to our earlier analogy, macroprudential supervisors may
thus struggle to see anything beyond the tip of the derivatives iceberg.
Appendix A identifies several contractual data points that regulators
could theoretically collect through SDRs for the purpose of enhancing
their macroprudential surveillance of derivatives markets.
C. Mandatory Central Clearing of Standardized Derivatives
The Dodd-Frank Act trade reporting and disclosure requirements
represent an important step in the evolution of derivatives regulation.
Arguably more important, however, has been the introduction of
mandatory central clearing for many standardized swaps. Section 723
of the Dodd-Frank Act makes it unlawful for a trader to enter into
any swap that meets certain standardization, liquidity, and other
requirements unless that swap has been accepted for clearing by an
authorized clearinghouse. 237 The perceived benefits of central clearing
flow principally from the mechanisms that clearinghouses employ to
236 See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, THE AIG RESCUE, ITS IMPACT ON MARKETS, AND
THE GOVERNMENT's EXIT STRATEGY, S. Doc. No. 56-698, at 29-36, 55-58 (2010)
(examining the reasons for the failure of AIG and the mechanics of the subsequent
bailout); Duffie, supra note 156 (describing the vulnerability of dealers to runs by
derivatives and repo counterparties and other creditors); Roe, supra note 169, at 550-54
(describing the runs by derivatives and repo counterparties on AIG, Bear Stearns, and
Lehman Brothers).
237 The mandatory clearing requirement under section 723 does not apply to commercial
end-users entering into swaps for the purpose of hedging or mitigating commercial risk.
When determining whether a swap should be subject to mandatory clearing, the CFTC
must take into account the aggregate outstanding notional value of the relevant species of
swap, the level of market liquidity, the availability of pricing data, the robustness of the
infrastructure needed to clear the swap, the effect of central clearing on systemic risk and
competition, and the existence of reasonable legal certainty with regards to the treatment
of counterparty positions, funds, and property. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 723, 124 Stat. 1376, 1675 (2010) (codified
at 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)(2)(D)). The SEC has adopted similar rules for swaps falling under its
jurisdiction. Process for Submissions for Review of Security-Based Swaps for Mandatory
Clearing and Notice Filing Requirements for Clearing Agencies, 77 Fed. Reg. 41,602 (July
13, 2012) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.C3a-1, 249).
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manage counterparty credit risk. 38 First, clearinghouses utilize multi-
lateral netting as a means of eliminating offsetting exposures, thereby
reducing the overall size and number of payment obligations and thus
each counterparty's exposure in the event of counterparty default.239
Second, clearinghouses seek to minimize residual net exposures after
multilateral netting by requiring counterparties to post both initial and
variation margin.240 Unlike many bilaterally cleared swaps, however,
the variation margin demanded by clearinghouses is calculated on a
daily (or even more frequent) basis in order to reflect market move-
ments in the price of the underlying security. 241 Third, clearinghouses
employ a number of other loss sharing mechanisms designed to mini-
mize the risk of market disruption in the event of the failure of one or
more of its dealer (or "clearing") members.242 These mechanisms
include pre-committed default funds, recourse to the clearinghouse's
own capital, clearing member capital calls, and so-called "position
portability" procedures. 243 Collectively, these mechanisms-often
referred to as a clearinghouse's "default waterfall"-can be under-
stood as mutualizing the risks stemming from the default of one or
more clearing members.
A great deal of scholarship has already been written examining
the economics of central clearing,244 the governance and risk manage-
ment of clearinghouses, 245 the potential for regulatory arbitrage,246
238 ARMOUR ET AL., supra note 164 (manuscript at 472-74). For a more detailed
description of the mechanisms clearinghouses use to address counterparty credit risk, see
Craig Pirrong, The Economics of Clearing in Derivatives Markets: Netting, Asymmetric
Information, and the Sharing of Default Risks Through a Central Counterparty (Jan. 8,
2009) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1340
660 (analyzing the implications of the adoption of central clearing in relation to alternative
mechanisms for sharing default risks).
239 Clearinghouses also use "trade compression." Trade compression is a process
whereby economically redundant contracts are eliminated, thereby reducing the number of
contracts outstanding between two counterparties without impacting their net positions.
Pirrong, supra note 238, at 18-19, 26-27.
240 Id. at 18-19.
241 Id. at 19.
242 Id.
243 Position portability procedures obligate surviving clearing members to assume the
rights and obligations of trades entered into by defaulting clearing members. Pirrong,
supra note 238.
244 See, e.g., DARRELL DUFFIE ET AL., FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., POLICY
PERSPECTIVES ON OTC DERIVATIVES MARKET INFRASTRUCTURE (2010); Craig Pirrong,
The Clearinghouse Cure, REGULATION, Winter 2008-2009, at 44.
245 See, e.g., Sean J. Griffith, Governing Systemic Risk: Towards a Governance Structure
for Derivatives Clearinghouses, 61 EMORY L.J. 1153 (2012) (analyzing clearinghouse
governance and arguing in favor of the adoption of a new board structure more reflective
of the public-private role of clearinghouses); Yesha Yadav, The Problematic Case of
Clearinghouses in Complex Markets, 101 GEO. L.J. 387 (2013) (analyzing the CCP
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the impact of central clearing on the resolvability of derivatives
counterparties, 247 and the potential knock-on effects of mandatory
central clearing on financial stability.248 This scholarship reflects a
broad range of views regarding the desirability of mandatory central
clearing of standardized derivatives. From the perspective of market
efficiency, however, central clearing can be understood as holding out
an important-and yet generally underappreciated-potential benefit.
As we have already seen, economic and legal heterogeneity represent
potentially significant obstacles to derivatives market efficiency. Cen-
tral clearing can reduce this heterogeneity in three ways. First, in
order to ensure that clearinghouses are able to net out the risks arising
from offsetting contracts, the legal architecture supporting centrally
cleared swaps must be highly standardized. 249 Second, insofar as clear-
inghouses impose the same margin and collateral requirements on all
trades in a given species of swaps, they reduce economic heteroge-
neity in collateral practices. 250 Third, central clearing involves the
novation of contracts from the original counterparties to the clearing-
house itself. In what has become one of the most repeated phrases in
finance, the clearinghouse thus becomes "the buyer to every seller,
and the seller to every buyer." 251 Insofar as counterparties possess any
residual incentives to screen for and monitor the creditworthiness of
their counterparties after the operation of closeout netting and collat-
governance structure and evaluating its ability to mitigate the risks of trading credit
derivatives).
246 See, e.g., Dan Awrey, Toward a Supply-Side Theory of Financial Innovation, 41 J.
COMP. ECON. 401 (2013) (examining the incentives to curb the risks of regulatory arbitrage
generated by financial innovation); Gabriel D. Rosenberg & Jai R. Massari, Regulation
Through Substitution as Policy Tool: Swap Futurization Under Dodd-Frank, 2013 COLUM.
Bus. L. REv. 667 (explaining futurization with the economic model of "regulation through
substitution" to address, among other things, regulatory arbitrage).
247 See Richard Squire, Clearinghouses as Liquidity Partitioning, 99 CORNELL L. REV.
857 (2014) (observing that central clearing accelerates payouts to derivatives
counterparties).
248 See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Clearinghouse Overconfidence, 101 CALIF. L. REv. 1641
(2013) (assessing the value of clearinghouses in containing systemic risk); Craig Pirrong, A
Bill of Goods: CCPs and Systemic Risk, J. FIN. MKT. INFRASTRUCTURES, June 2014, at 55
(analyzing the systemic impact of netting, collateral, and how the mandating of clearing
affects interconnectedness in the financial system).
249 See MEEHAN & ROSENBERG, supra note 201, at 317.
250 One possible area of divergence is in the amount and quality of the collateral posted
by individual counterparties. While clearinghouses will often prescribe the classes of
eligible collateral, they will also typically provide counterparties with a "menu" of
collateral options, thus enabling them to retain some discretion in terms of the amount and
type of eligible collateral to post in satisfaction of their initial and variation margin
obligations.
251 See HARRIS, supra note 113, at 42. A Google search of this phrase returned
approximately 12,200 results.
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eral mechanisms, novation thus eliminates the need to make invest-
ments in the screening and monitoring of any counterparty other than
the clearinghouse itself. In theory at least, this should serve to dramat-
ically reduce the idiosyncratic costs of counterparty due diligence,
especially where clearinghouses are required to disclose information
about their capital structure, governance, and risk management poli-
cies. In effect, by reducing the noise generated by the dark side of
derivatives contracts, central clearing can thus enhance the quality of
the signal sent by derivatives prices. Accordingly, while the overall
desirability of mandatory central clearing is still very much open to
debate, 252 increasing the proportion of derivatives trades routed
through clearinghouses may have a positive impact on market
efficiency.
The prospective benefits of central clearing associated with
greater legal and economic homogeneity also point to at least two
potentially significant limits. First, insofar as the regulation of clear-
inghouses diverges across jurisdictions, legal and economic heteroge-
neity will continue to exist within centrally-cleared derivatives
markets. In theory, the leaders of the G20 group of countries have
publicly committed to mandatory central clearing of standardized
derivatives.253 In practice, however, significant areas of divergence can
be observed in the design and implementation of the relevant regula-
tory reforms. Yesha Yadav and Dermot Turing, for example, have
identified divergence between the Dodd-Frank Act and EMIR
regimes governing clearinghouses across a number of important
dimensions, from margin and collateral requirements, default fund
and waterfall mechanisms, and clearinghouse governance and risk
management, to supervisory oversight, stress testing, and access to
central bank emergency liquidity assistance. 254 Second, insofar as
many of the new regulatory reforms targeting clearinghouses are
framed as minimum standards, there is scope for clearinghouses to
respond to competitive pressures by attempting to differentiate them-
selves on the basis of non-price terms such as the amount or quality of
required collateral. Ultimately, the resulting heterogeneity may serve
to undercut the potential benefits of central clearing from the perspec-
tive of market efficiency.
252 See supra notes 244-48.
253 U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, LEADERS' STATEMENT: THE PITTSBURGH SUMMIT 9
(Sept. 24-25 2009), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/g7-g20/
Documents/pittsburgh-summitleaders statement_250909.pdf.
254 Yesha Yadav & Dermot Turing, The Extraterritorial Regulation of Clearinghouses, 2
J. FIN. REG. 21, 41 (2016).
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D. Prudential Regulation of Derivatives Dealers
In addition to enhancing the transparency of derivatives markets
and introducing mandatory central clearing for many standardized
derivatives, post-crisis regulatory reforms have also targeted the pru-
dential regulation of derivatives dealers. The majority of these
reforms have been spearheaded by the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision (BCBS) as part of its comprehensive amendments to its
international framework for the regulation, supervision, and risk man-
agement of banks, more commonly known as "Basel III." Basel III
refines the definition of capital for regulatory purposes, increases the
percentage of common equity tier-1 (CET1) capital that banks are
required to hold against risk-weighted assets, modifies the framework
for calculating the risk weightings applied to various asset classes, and
introduces a series of new capital buffers designed to reduce the pro-
cyclicality of capital requirements, constrain excessive lending during
periods of economic growth, and eliminate the "too-big-to-fail" sub-
sidy.255 Basel III also introduces a new maximum leverage ratio based
on non-risk weighted assets, 2 5 6 along with two new liquidity require-
ments: the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) 2 5 7 and Net Stable
Funding Ratio (NSFR). 258 The LCR is designed to ensure that banks
have a sufficient stock of high-quality liquid assets to survive a hypo-
thetical thirty-day stress scenario. The NSFR is designed to constrain
the reliance of banks on unstable, short-term sources of wholesale
funding.259
255 For more detailed information about the Basel III capital framework, see BASEL
COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, BASEL III: A GLOBAL
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING SYSTEMS (2011),
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl89.htm. For further information about the progress of Basel
III implementation in the United States, see Basel Regulatory Framework, BD.
GOVERNORS FOR FED. RESERVE Sys., http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/basel/
USImplementation.htm (last visited July 17, 2016). See also Regulatory Capital Rules:
Regulatory Capital, Implementation of Basel III, Capital Adequacy, Transition Provisions,
Prompt Corrective Action, Standardized Approach for Risk-Weighted Assets, Market
Discipline and Disclosure Requirements, Advanced Approaches Risk-Based Capital Rule,
and Market Risk Capital Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. 62,018 (Oct. 11, 2013) (codified at 12 C.F.R.
pts. 208, 217 & 225) [hereinafter U.S. Final Capital Rule].
256 BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, BASEL III
LEVERAGE RATIO FRAMEWORK AND DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS (2014), http://www.bis.
org/publ/bcbs270.htm.
257 BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, BASEL
III: THE LIQUIDITY COVERAGE RATIO AND LIQUIDITY RISK MONITORING TOOLS (2013),
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs238.htm.
258 BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, BASEL
III: THE NET STABLE FUNDING RATIO (2014), http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d295.htm.
259 Id.
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Basel III introduces a number of significant changes to the frame-
work for calculating risk-weightings for capital charges in connection
with both bilaterally and centrally-cleared derivatives trades. 260 For
bilaterally-cleared derivatives, Basel III augments the existing frame-
work governing the amount of capital that banks must hold against
counterparty credit risk with a new credit valuation adjustment
(CVA). 261 Whereas the previous framework essentially only required
banks to hold sufficient capital to cover losses stemming from
counterparty default, the CVA is designed to ensure that banks hold
sufficient capital to protect against any mark-to-market losses stem-
ming from the deterioration of a counterparty's creditworthiness over
the life of a derivatives contract.262 The introduction of the CVA is a
reflection of the fact that, during the recent crisis, approximately two-
thirds of realized losses experienced by banks on their derivatives
portfolios were attributable to the deterioration of counterparty credit
quality as opposed to actual counterparty default.263 Importantly, the
introduction of the CVA has coincided in the U.S. with the removal of
what was previously a fifty percent ceiling on the risk weights applied
to derivatives exposures.26
Basel III also introduces a new risk-weighting framework for cen-
trally cleared derivatives. First, where a bank enters into a derivatives
trade for its own purposes, Basel III imposes a relatively modest cap-
ital charge equal to two percent of the resulting trade exposure to any
qualifying clearinghouse. 265 A qualifying clearinghouse for these pur-
poses is effectively one that complies with the CPMI-IOSCO
260 Capital requirements mandate a specified percentage of a bank's financing-relative
to its assets-that must be in the form of equity and other forms of "regulatory" capital.
The assets on which these capital requirements are based are then subject to risk weighting,
with the objective of ensuring that as a bank invests in riskier assets it will be required to
finance itself using a higher proportion of equity and other forms of regulatory capital. See
generally ARMOUR ET AL., supra note 164 (manuscript at 290-315).
261 See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, supra
note 255, at 3; see also U.S. Final Capital Rule, supra note 255 (describing the increased
capital requirements under the new CVA requirements).
262 BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, supra
note 255, at 3; see also BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT'L
SETILEMENTs, REGULATORY REFORM OF OVER-THE-COUNTER DERIVATIVES: AN
ASSESSMENT OF INCENTIVES TO CLEAR CENTRALLY 4 (2014), http://www.bis.org/publ/
othp2l.htm ("[Tihe CVA capital charge addresses the potential mark-to-market loss
caused by an increase in the credit spread of the counterparty.").
263 U.S. Final Capital Rule, supra note 255, at 62,134.
264 Id. at 62,096; see also U.S. Basel III Final Rule: Standardized Risk Weights Tool,
DAVIS POLK, http://www.usbasel3.com/tool/ (last visited July 17, 2016).
265 BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, CAPITAL
REQUIREMENTS FOR BANK EXPOSURES TO CENTRAL COUNTERPARTIEs 4-5 (2012), http://
www.bis.org/publ/bcbs227.pdf. The two percent risk weighting against trade exposures to
clearinghouses also applies where a bank clears trades on behalf of its clients, but only
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Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures.266 In contrast, the
equivalent risk weightings for trades cleared through non-qualifying
clearinghouses range from twenty to one hundred percent depending
on the identity of the clearinghouse. 267 Second, Basel III imposes a
capital charge on clearing members on the basis of their exposure to a
clearinghouse's default fund.2 6 8 As described above, in order to mutu-
alize any residual losses stemming from the default of a clearing
member, clearinghouses typically require members to contribute to a
default fund that can be drawn down in the event that any other
member defaults on its obligations and the resulting losses to the
clearinghouse exceed both the posted margin and default fund contri-
bution of the defaulting member.269 While the new trade exposure
charge is designed to ensure that a bank has sufficient capital to cover
losses arising from its direct exposure to a clearinghouse, the new
default fund exposure charge can thus be understood as designed to
ensure that banks hold sufficient capital against their indirect expo-
sure to the default of other clearing members.
Amongst the many ways that banks can soften the impact of the
Basel III capital requirements is the utilization of credit risk mitiga-
tion techniques such as collateralization: the posting of initial and vari-
ation margin. For example, by ensuring that their derivatives trade
exposures are sufficiently collateralized by high quality liquid assets,
counterparties can reduce the amount of capital they are required to
hold against counterparty credit risk.270 Against this backdrop, policy-
makers have recently introduced a number of regulatory reforms that
can be expected to have an impact on both the supply and demand for
eligible collateral. First, the BCBS and International Organization of
Securities Commission (IOSCO) have introduced a new framework
imposing more onerous margin requirements on bilaterally cleared
derivatives.271 This framework articulates baseline minimum amounts
where the bank also guarantees the client against any losses stemming from the failure of
the relevant clearinghouse. Id. at 6.
266 Id. at 2. For further details, see Comm. PAYMENT & SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS, BANK
FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, PRINCIPLES FOR FINANCIAL MARKET INFRASTRUCTURES (2012),
http://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d101a.pdf. Ultimately, one could ask whether these principles
are sufficiently detailed to make any assessment of "compliance" truly meaningful.
267 BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, supra
note 265, at 7 n.12.
268 Id. at 7-10.
269 See supra Section IV.C (describing the elements of a clearinghouse's capital
waterfall).
270 For further information, see Comm. PAYMENT & SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS, BANK FOR
INT'L SETTLEMENTS, supra note 266, at 26-47.
271 BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS & INT'L
ORG. OF SEC. COMM'NS, MARGIN REQUIREMENTS FOR NON-CENTRALLY CLEARED
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and methodologies for calculating initial and variation margin'272
requires the bilateral exchange of both initial and daily variation
margin on a gross basis 273 provides guidance regarding the definition
of eligible collateral and collateral haircuts, 274 and prescribes the use
of collateral holding models that ensure the collateral is immediately
available to the collateral taker in the event of default.275 Second, the
push toward mandatory central clearing-and with it daily mark-to-
market margining by clearinghouses-will mean that clearing mem-
bers must be prepared to post high-quality liquid assets on short
notice in satisfaction of variation margin requirements. In order to sat-
isfy these requirements, along with the new LCR, it is likely that
clearing members will be compelled to hold a higher proportion of
eligible collateral assets on their balance sheets. Finally, the Financial
Stability Board (FSB) has proposed restrictions on the ability of
dealers and other market participants to reuse or rehypothecate col-
lateral posted in connection with repurchase agreements, securities
lending transactions, or the provision of prime brokerage services.276
If adopted, these restrictions will limit the ability of dealers to use
posted collateral for the purpose of financing their proprietary trading
activities. 277 In the aggregate, these reforms seem likely to increase
the demand for high-quality liquid collateral assets, and thus also
increase the cost of collateralizing derivatives trades. What is more,.
they will be doing so at precisely the same time that new capital
requirements are incentivizing greater collateralization of derivatives
trades.278
DERIVATIVES (2015), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs261.pdf [hereinafter BIS/IOSCO
MARGIN REQUIREMENTS]. These rules have recently been incorporated into U.S. law.
Margin and Capital Requirements for Covered Swap Entities, 80 Fed. Reg. 74,840 (Nov.
30, 2015) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 45, 237, 349, 624 & 1221); Margin Requirements for
Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants, 81 Fed. Reg. 636 (Jan. 6,
2016) (codified at 17 C.FR. pts. 23 & 140). The SEC is expected to adopt equivalent rules
in the near future.
272 BIS/IOSCO MARGIN REQUIREMENTS, supra note 271, at 10-16.
273 Id. at 9.
274 Id. at 16-18, 26.
275 Id. at 18-21.
276 FIN. STABILITY BD., STRENGTHENING OVERSIGHT AND REGULATION OF SHADOW
BANKING: POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR STRENGTHENING OVERSIGHT AND REGULATION OF
SHADOW BANKING ENTITIES (2013), www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/uploads/
r_130829b.pdf?page-moved=1.
277 See id. at 16.
278 The cost of collateral can be understood as the difference between the cost of
funding the acquisition and holding of the collateral and the return generated on the
collateral. Viewed from this perspective, it is effectively the opportunity cost of holding
collateral versus other assets.
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Together with other recent regulatory reforms targeting deriva-
tives markets, these new capital, liquidity, and collateral requirements
will almost inevitably increase the costs of market making for deriva-
tives dealers. Global consulting firm McKinsey & Company has esti-
mated that the new capital requirements introduced under Basel III
will increase costs by an average of eighty-five basis points (0.85 per-
cent) for unnetted, uncollateralized derivatives trades.279 Com-
pounding these costs, Manmohan Singh has estimated that the shift
toward mandatory central clearing may require up to US $200 billion
in additional initial margin. 280 The BCBS and IOSCO, meanwhile,
have estimated that between C700 billion and C1.7 trillion in initial
margin will be required to collateralize bilaterally-cleared derivatives
trades.281 The BCBS has also estimated that the new LCR will
increase demand for high-quality liquid assets by approximately C1.8
trillion.28 2
Ultimately, of course, it is difficult to quantify the marginal costs
of these reforms with any real precision. It is equally difficult to pre-
dict how dealers will respond to them. Nevertheless, a number of
industry observers have predicted that dealers may respond by with-
drawing from market making in connection with many lower margin
derivatives contracts. 283 The probability of such a withdrawal has no
doubt increased following the implementation of the so-called
279 Philipp HArle et al., Basel III and European Banking: Its Impact, How Banks Might
Respond, and the Challenges of Implementation 9-11 (McKinsey, Working Papers on Risk
No. 26, Nov. 2010), http://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/risk/our-insights/basel-iii-
and-european-banking.
280 Manmohan Singh, Collateral, Netting and Systemic Risk in the OTC Derivatives
Markets 10 (Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 10/99, 2010), http://www.imf.org/
external/pubs/ft/wp/2010/wpl099.pdf.
281 BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS & INT'L
ORG. OF SEC. COMM'NS, MARGIN REQUIREMENTS FOR NON-CENTRALLY CLEARED
DERIVATIVES, CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT (2012), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs226.pdf;
BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS & INT'L ORG.
OF SEC. COMM'NS, MARGIN REQUIREMENTS FOR NON-CENTRALLY CLEARED
DERIVATIVES, SECOND CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT (2013) at 33, http://www.bis.org/publ/
bcbs242.pdf.
282 BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS & INT'L
ORG. OF SEC. COMM'NS, RESULTS OF THE BASEL III MONITORING EXERCISE AS OF 30
JUNE 2011 (2012), at 3, 18, 20, http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs217.pdf; BASEL COMM. ON
BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS & INT'L ORG. OF SEC. COMM'NS,
BASEL III: INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR LIQUIDITY RISK MEASUREMENT,
STANDARDS AND MONITORING (2010), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl88.pdf (discussing the
possible shortage of high quality assets).
283 See, e.g., DELOITTE, OTC DERIVATIVES: THE NEW COST OF TRADING 2 (2014),
http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/uk/Documents/financial-services/deloitte-
uk-fs-otc-derivatives-april-14.pdf (predicting that dealer banks may withdraw from asset
classes "deemed to be too costly").
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"Volcker Rule," 2 8 4 which severely limits the ability of dealer banks to
engage in proprietary trading alongside their market-making activi-
ties-thus eliminating one of the means by which dealers might seek
to monetize the informational advantages they enjoy by virtue of their
role as structurally informed traders. 285 Most importantly for the pre-
sent purposes, should these reforms precipitate such a correlated with-
drawal, this would seem highly likely to have an adverse impact on
market liquidity and, with it, informational efficiency. This serves to
highlight a potential tradeoff between the prudential regulation of
derivatives dealers and the incentives of these structurally-informed
traders to perform their vital market-making role.
E. The Optimal Balance Between Private Ordering
and Public Regulation
A good deal of scholarship has already been written examining
the optimal balance between private ordering and public regulation
within derivatives markets.286 As we have seen, private actors such as
dealers, interdealer brokers, ECNs, and ISDA have each played a sig-
nificant role in the emergence, development, and ongoing evolution of
derivatives markets. At the same time, however, and as we might
expect, these private actors do not always possess the strongest incen-
tives to respond to the myriad of information, agency, and other
284 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 619, 124 Stat. 1376, 1620 (2010).
285 For an overview of how the Volcker Rule could serve to reduce liquidity within
derivatives and other markets, see Darrell Duffie, Market Making Under the Proposed
Volcker Rule (Rock Ctr. for Corp. Governance, Working Paper No. 106, 2012), http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1990472.
286 See, e.g., Dan Awrey, The Dynamics of OTC Derivatives Regulation: Bridging the
Public-Private Divide, 11 EUR. Bus. ORG. L. REv. 155 (2010) (exploring public and private
systems of ordering and ultimately endorsing modes that abandon this distinction); Sean
M. Flanagan, The Rise of a Trade Association: Group Interactions Within the International
Swaps and Derivatives Association, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 211 (2001) (describing the
functions and strengths of the ISDA as a trade association for individuals involved with
over-the-counter derivatives markets); John T. Lynch, Comment, Credit Derivatives:
Industry Initiative Supplants Need for Direct Regulatory Intervention-A Model for the
Future of U.S. Regulation?, 55 BUFF. L. REv. 1371 (2008) (describing the success of the
private sector initiatives to address problems in the credit derivatives market and
proposing a shift toward self-regulation of these markets); Brian J.M. Quinn, The Failure
of Private Ordering and the Financial Crisis of 2008, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 549 (2009)
(arguing that private ordering has failed to adequately address market failures and
endorsing specific regulatory measures as a means of producing desired outcomes); Lynn
A. Stout, Why the Law Hates Speculators: Regulation and Private Ordering in the Market
for OTC Derivatives, 48 DUKE L.J. 701 (1999) (describing a hybrid model of regulation as
an alternative to the binary options of regulation and exemption and the benefits of such a
model).
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problems encountered within these markets.287 Dealers, for example,
have sometimes abused their market power and position as structur-
ally-informed traders to exploit financially unsophisticated clients.288
And while hard data is scarce, it is likely that a significant fraction of
historical derivatives trading activity has been significantly undercol-
lateralized, thereby generating risks to both institutional and broader
financial stability.28 9 In theory, the failure of private actors to effec-
tively respond to these problems opens a window for public regulatory
intervention-a window that policymakers have been quick to jump
through in the wake of the financial crisis. Ideally, however, this
impulse should be constrained in favor of a more rigorous examina-
tion of the feasibility, potential costs and benefits, and likely behav-
ioral impact of public regulatory intervention.290
Our examination of the mechanisms of derivatives market effi-
ciency holds out a number of potentially useful insights into important
policy issues at the intersection of private ordering and public regula-
tion. This section briefly examines two of these issues. The first stems
from recent proposals to supplement or replace conventional capital
requirements for banks with more market-based indicators of institu-
tional stability. Oliver Hart and Luigi Zingales, for example, have
advanced a proposal that would replace capital requirements for sys-
temically important banks with prudential requirements based on
these banks' CDS prices.291 Under Hart and Zingales's proposal,
where CDS spreads on a bank's junior term debt exceed specified
thresholds, this would trigger a requirement for the bank to raise addi-
tional equity or enable prudential supervisors to take other remedial
measures. 292 In effect, this proposal seeks to harness the perceived
informational efficiency of CDS markets to negative credit informa-
tion in order to create an "early warning system"293 alerting regulators
to potential institutional instability.
287 See Awrey, supra note 116, at 190-200 (describing the positive network externalities,
path dependency, and power imbalances that impede the efficient emergence,
development, and evolution of systems of private ordering).
288 See, e.g., Interest Rate Hedging Products (IRHP), supra note 119 (detailing recent
UK swaps mis-selling scandal).
289 See Manmohan Singh, Under-Collateralisation and Rehypothecation in the OTC
Derivatives Markets, BANQUE DE FRANCE FIN. STABILITY REv., July 2010, at 113, 114.
290 This approach is reflected in Ronald Coase's statement that "[s]atisfactory views on
policy can only come from a patient study of how, in practice, the market, firms, and
governments handle the problem of harmful effects." R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social
Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1, 18 (1960).
291 See Hart & Zingales, supra note 83.
292 Id. at 453.
293 Id. at 455.
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The desirability of Hart and Zingales's proposal is contingent on
the quality of the signal sent by CDS prices.294 As we have already
observed, however, this signal may be vulnerable to distortions stem-
ming from idiosyncratic counterparty credit risk, along with other
potential sources of legal and economic heterogeneity. CDS prices
may also be distorted by the simultaneous withdrawal of liquidity by
dealers and other market participants during periods of broader
market disruption. During periods of market disruption, an observed
increase in CDS spreads may therefore reflect a systemic adverse
selection problem of the variety observed in connection with the
recent crisis as opposed to the market's assessment of the
creditworthiness of individual banks. This puts prudential supervisors
in the difficult position of having to distinguish between those banks
that actually require recapitalization in order to avoid potential sol-
vency problems, and those that-while also caught up in the system-
wide adverse selection problem-are otherwise fundamentally sound.
Out of an abundance of caution, supervisors might reasonably elect
under these circumstances to require all systemically important banks
to raise fresh capital,295 thus essentially negating the primary benefit
of this more market-based approach toward capital requirements.
As we have seen, part of the solution to this problem is to subject
the CDS contracts upon which Hart and Zingales's proposal relies to
mandatory central clearing. This would eliminate the distortions gen-
erated by idiosyncratic counterparty credit risk, if not those stemming
from any deterioration in the creditworthiness of the relevant
clearinghouse. These CDS should also be subject to mandatory
exchange trading,296 thereby ensuring the existence of at least one
source of market liquidity that is at least theoretically independent of
the willingness of dealers to make markets in these contracts.297 Ulti-
mately, however, even these relatively interventionist measures
cannot completely eliminate the possibility that bank CDS prices may
294 Hart and Zingales do contemplate that prudential supervisors will conduct a stress
test on the relevant bank for the purposes of determining whether CDS prices are
accurate. Id. at 457. Even here, however, there are important questions surrounding the
feasibility of conducting these tests on multiple banks, and within a relatively short
timespan, in the context of an unfolding crisis.
295 As the U.S. federal government arguably did in the fall of 2008 when it required
many of its largest and most interconnected banks to issue new preferred shares and
warrants pursuant to the Capital Purchase Program under the Troubled Asset Relief
Program.
296 Id. at 466. While Hart and Zingales do suggest that the relevant CDS contracts
should be traded on exchanges, they do not provide an explicit rationale for this
suggestion.
297 In practice, of course, dealers might also represent significant sources of liquidity as
both buyers and sellers within exchange-traded derivatives markets.
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be the least informative at the precise moment at which this informa-
tion is most urgently required. -1
The prospect that dealers might withdraw from derivatives
market-making has a second potential implication in terms of the
optimal balance between public and private ordering. Given the struc-
ture of derivatives markets, we would expect the correlated with-
drawal of liquidity by dealers to have a significant impact on market
efficiency. Insofar as well-functioning derivatives markets are essential
to effective risk management by banks and other financial institutions,
the withdrawal of liquidity might also be expected to have an adverse
impact on financial stability. Against this backdrop, the threat of with-
drawal can be understood as giving dealers powerful leverage over
elected officials, regulatory authorities, and financial supervisors who
understandably do not want to be perceived as adopting policies-for
example, capital, liquidity, collateral, or other requirements-that
threaten to undermine market efficiency or stability. It is not incon-
ceivable that dealers would then wield this leverage in order to lobby
for the adoption of regulatory requirements that do not impose signif-
icant costs or which entrench their position as structurally-informed
traders. Viewed from this perspective, the dealer-intermediated struc-
ture of derivatives markets thus exacerbates the already acute political
economy problems that often undermine the pursuit of effective
financial regulation.
One way that policymakers can potentially dilute the potency of
this threat is by taking a more proactive approach toward the develop-
ment of alternative sources of market liquidity. One possible option
would be to compel derivatives exchanges to make derivatives instru-
ments deemed to have some degree of systemic importance available
for trading as a condition of their registration. Instruments falling into
this category might include, for example, certain highly liquid interest
rate and currency derivatives, or the CDS written on the debt of sys-
temically important banks envisioned by Hart and Zingales's pro-
posal. In exchange, regulators could provide derivatives exchanges
with subsidized liquidity support or loss mutualization mechanisms in
connection with trading in these instruments.
A second and more radical option would be for central banks
such as the U.S. Federal Reserve System to play a more active role in
derivatives market-making. Indeed, in many respects, central banks-
with their vast networks of member banks, large balance sheets, and
the effective absence of counterparty credit risk-are almost the ideal
market makers. Thus, for example, and putting aside the fact that this
would likely require significant changes to the scope of its authority
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under the Federal Reserve Act,2 9 8 the Fed could publish firm quotes
on systemically important derivatives instruments. Under normal
market conditions, these quotes could be set just outside the pre-
vailing bid and asking prices quoted by private dealers, thereby mini-
mizing any market distortions stemming from the Fed's presence in
the market. At the same time, this presence would offer a credible
alternative for those not wanting to transact with private dealers, or in
the event of the widespread withdrawal of private liquidity. In effect,
this option would institutionalize what Perry Mehrling has described
as the Fed's "dealer of last resort" function in the context of both the
recent and previous financial crises.299
While this option might at first glance seem like a dramatic
expansion of the role of the state within ostensibly private markets, it
is worth making three preliminary observations. First, as illustrated by
large-scale interventions of the U.S. Treasury and Federal Reserve
during the recent crisis, states already perform this role during periods
of systemic instability. What is more, formalizing this role along with
the credible threat of ex post sanctions-for example compensation
clawbacks and personal liability for officers and directors-could help
constrain the moral hazard associated with the near inevitability of
state intervention in these circumstances.300 Second, states arguably
possess a comparative advantage over private derivatives dealers in
terms of their ability to make markets in derivatives. Specifically, the
size of their balance sheets, the absence of binding solvency or
liquidity constraints, and the legal authority to print money puts states
in an advantageous position to provide the missing markets for
liquidity during periods of financial instability. The state is thus able to
provide credible insurance against systemic replacement risk. Finally,
a well-designed dealer of last resort mechanism presents something of
a "win-win" proposition. If the threat of correlated dealer withdrawal
or failure is credible, the dealer of last resort mechanism can play an
important role in stabilizing derivatives markets. Meanwhile, if the
threat is not credible, the distortions generated by state intervention
into private markets are likely to be minimal as relatively few, if any,
market participants will take advantage of this mechanism.
The objective in identifying these possible options is not to put
them forward as optimal strategies for reducing the political economy
298 Federal Reserve Act, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
12 U.S.C.).
299 See MEHRLING, supra note 139, at 132.
300 For a compelling argument in favor of the imposition of these mechanisms (and in
particular personal liability for officers and directors), see John Armour & Jeffrey N.
Gordon, Systemic Harms and Shareholder Value, 6 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 35, 61-76 (2014).
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and other problems stemming from the dealer-intermediated structure
of derivatives markets. Indeed, these options raise important theoret-
ical and practical questions in terms of their design, implementation,
and potential costs. A comprehensive exploration of these options and
questions resides beyond the scope of this Article. What identifying
these options does do, however, is illustrate how understanding the
structure of derivatives markets-and the mechanisms of derivatives
market efficiency-can help us better frame these important policy
problems and identify potential strategies for tackling them.
CONCLUSION
Derivatives are different. These differences stem from the execu-
tory nature of derivatives contracts, the dealer-intermediated struc-
ture of the markets in which they trade, and the role of derivatives
dealers as the primary sources of market liquidity. These differences
generate information, agency, coordination, and other problems not
generally encountered within public equity markets. These problems
have led to the emergence of a unique constellation of institutional
arrangements that-in theory at least-serve to promote derivatives
market efficiency. To date, however, the contribution of these mecha-
nisms toward derivatives market efficiency has received surprisingly
little attention from scholars or policymakers. Reflecting this gap in
our understanding, the role and importance of these mechanisms has
not featured prominently in recent policy debates examining the
impact of post-crisis regulatory reforms targeting derivatives markets.
The objective of this Article has been to close this gap.
Ultimately, perhaps the most important contribution of this
Article is to identify avenues for further theoretical and empirical
research. As a preliminary matter, there is still a paucity of empirical
research examining how (and how quickly) derivatives markets other
than those for CDS impact new information into prices. Given the
potentially significant differences in terms of the information sensi-
tivity of the underlying assets, the ability of traders to identify traders
with superior information, and other factors, we must be careful not to
extrapolate too far on the basis of existing evidence. Second, there is
still much to learn about the more granular operation of the mecha-
nisms of derivatives market efficiency. How much information do
traders actually glean off the trading activities of derivatives dealers?
From interdealer brokers and ECNs? And how-if at all-do traders
take into account the economic and legal heterogeneity of derivatives
contracts in the process of determining prices? Third, we are still
largely in the dark about the dark side of derivatives markets. How
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well are derivatives markets collateralized? How heterogeneous are
the contractual terms surrounding, for example, variation margin trig-
gers? And how do these terms differ between bilateral and centrally
cleared markets, and across jurisdictions? Finally, we still have a long
way to go to understand the impact of recent regulatory reforms on
derivatives trade volumes, market structure and liquidity, and infor-
mational efficiency. The answers to these questions are vital if we are
to better understand the role derivatives play in modern financial
markets and how best to approach their regulation.
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APPENDIX
Contractual Data Point Reported As
Applicable Law
1. The jurisdiction of the law governing the [e.g., NY]
contract (typically New York or the UK).
2. The jurisdiction of incorporation of each of
the counterparties (for the purposes of
determining relevant contract, property, and
insolvency rules).
Assignmient_________
3. Whether the contract is assignable by one or
both parties (for the purposes of determining
whether counterparties may "run by
assignment" as took place in the case of Bear
Stearns. This information also ties in with data [Y/N]
point 9 below as the ability of a counterparty to
return any pledged collateral upon assignment
will be a function of whether it has reused or
rehypothecated this collateral).
Closeout Netting 
________
4. Whether the contract is subject to standard
ISDA provisions in relation to closeout netting
(for the purpose of calculating net cash flows [Y/NJ
upon default -assuming information about
other relevant exposures is available).
UCotlateralization
5. Whether the collateral is posted pursuant to [TT/SI
a title transfer or security interest system.
6. Whether one or both counterparties are
required to post an initial amount (IA) at the
outset of a contract (this information would
ideally be supplemented by information about [Y/N]
the amount and quality of pledged collateral,
along with the historical correlation between
the collateral assets and underlying).
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7. Whether one or both counterparties are
required to post variation margin (VM) over
the duration of the contract (again, this
information would ideally be supplemented by [Y/N]
information about the amount, quality, and
correlations of pledged collateral-if specified
ex ante) 
.
8. The timing for the calculation and delivery of [D/WIQ]
VM (e.g., daily, weekly, quarterly, etc.).
9. Any triggering events which have the effect of
obligating a party to post VM-e.g., changes in
the market value of the underlying or
downgrades in the credit rating of either a
counterparty or, in the case of credit [e.g., CR
derivatives, underlying reference entities or downgrade]
obligations (for the purpose of determining
whether a counterparty may be subject to
procyclical collateral calls as took place in the
case of AIG Financial Products).
10. Whether one or both parties have permitted
the reuse or rehypothecation of pledged
collateral (this information ties in with points 1 [Y/N]
and 2 above as the treatment of pledged
collateral varies by jurisdiction).
[e.g., percentage of
11. Measures of the composition of posted collateral of
collateral. different asset
classes]
[e.g., collateral
baskets used by
central banks in
12. Measures of the quality of posted collateral. continwhconnection with
access to the
discount window]
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